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Bailing Out the Lazy Commercial Purchaser from
the Murky Waters of Resale
I. INTRODUCTION
"Tort law should not be bent so far out of its traditional progressive
path and discipline by allowing tort lawsuits where the claims at issue
are, fundamentally and in all relevant respects, essentially contractual,
product-failure controversies. Tort law is not the answer for this kind
of loss of commercial bargain."'
The New York Court of Appeals decision noted above illustrates the
dominant interpretation of tort law in products liability.2 Specifically,
in the commercial context, courts typically allow tort recovery only
when warranty-contract law3 is infeasible; however, courts in some
instances 4 allow tort recovery even when recovery in warranty-contract
is allowed.5 Thus, although no longer the only outlet for recovery in
product liability actions, warranty-contract law still primarily restricts
the scope of recovery in commercial bargains.6
The increase in the amount of controversies and conflicts before the
courts stems from the growth in products liability law. In part,
pending suits focus on the circumstances surrounding the loss of the
1. Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y.
1995) (stating in a New York Court of Appeals decision that the focus of economic loss
is on the plaintiff's bargain).
2. "Products liability is the name currently given to the area of tort law involving the
liability of those who supply goods or products for the use of others to purchasers,
users, and bystanders for losses of various kinds" that result from alleged product
defects. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 677
(5th ed. 1984).
3. The law of contracts includes the assignment of contract rights, debts, rights to
performance, and rights to damages or restitution for breaches of contract. See 4
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 857, at 411 (1st ed. 1951); see also
KENNETH Ross ET AL., PRODUCT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE
215-17 (1985) (discussing a manufacturer's duty to recall or warn consumers).
4. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing a purchaser's windfall and recovery in tort where
contract was possible).
5. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986).
"When a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and
those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong." Id.
6. See infra notes 20-67 and accompanying text discussing warranty recovery and the
introduction of tort law in products liability law.
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product and the scope! of a manufacturer's liability as the product
moves through the market chain of distribution. In Saratoga Fishing
Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.,' the Supreme Court defined the scope of
recovery for a second user in the chain of distribution when a defect in
the original product caused damage to additional equipment attached to
the product by an earlier user in the chain of distribution.' The Court
held that "other property"9 in the market chain of distribution includes
additional equipment subsequently added to the product by the initial
user.' ° Therefore, subsequent users who purchase the product from
the initial buyer-user in the chain of distribution may seek tort relief
from the manufacturer for damage caused to "other property" by the
product." In Saratoga, as an issue of first impression, the Supreme
Court addressed whether a second user in the market chain of
distribution can recover in tort for damage caused to additional
equipment. 2 In so doing, the Court disregarded earlier state and
lower federal court interpretations that piloted contract remedies as the
means of reimbursement for economic loss.13
This Note first summarizes the evolution of privity, contract-
warranty, and tort law recovery within the area of products liability. 14
It next addresses the historical battles between the application of
contract and tort law and the underlying theories dictating recovery in
tort law for loss or damage of products. 5 Further, this Note
addresses judicial restrictions upon the form of recovery depending
upon the nature of the loss and traces the subsequent court decisions
7. 117 S. Ct. 1783 (1997).
8. See id. at 1786-88.
9. See East River, 476 U.S. at 867-68 (requiring "other property," not simply the
product itself, to be damaged when the plaintiff pursues a property damage tort claim).
The meaning of "other property" is frequently the center of dispute in products liability
actions. See infra Part II.D.4 for a discussion on how to define the product. Prior to
Saratoga, the Third Circuit defined "other property" as the product plaintiff purchased
rather than what the defendant sold. See King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051 (3d
Cir. 1988).
10. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1786 (stating that "other property" includes "the
equipment added by the Initial User before he sold the ship to the Subsequent User").
11. See id. at 1788-89. Prior to Saratoga, "the product" was "the finished product
bargained for by the buyer" instead of the individual components that comprise the
entire product. Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925, 930 (5th
Cir. 1987).
12. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1786-88.
13. See id. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the issue in Saratoga has been
discussed only by the very court now on review).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B-C.
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that have grappled with the meaning of these restrictions. 6 In
addition, this Note discusses the majority and dissenting opinions in
Saratoga and the Court's attempt to distinguish among lower federal
and state court opinions as well as its own prior ruling on an
analogous issue.'7 It then criticizes the Saratoga decision for upsetting
the balance between tort and contract law and for disregarding the
well-settled preference for contract law within the context of products
liability. 18 Finally, this Note predicts the impact of the decision in
Saratoga upon the liability of product manufacturers and anticipates
future judicial interpretations of the proper form of recovery.19
II. BACKGROUND
The avenue of recovery available to those injured by products has
evolved during the last several decades. Accordingly, the amount and
type of recovery available to injured purchasers, users, and bystanders
are inconsistent. Throughout this period, courts have grappled with
the prevalent policy choices that dictate the type of recovery for a
certain type of loss.
A. Theories Of Recovery: Products Liability
Products liability actions vary depending upon the loss suffered and
the persons suffering such loss. 20 Typically, five categories of loss
determine the applicability of either tort or contract remedies.2'
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts defines these five losses as
the following:
16. See infra Part II.D.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 95, at 677.
21. See id. § 95, at 678. A breakdown of these five losses illuminates that losses
may occur to either the purchaser or others in contact with the product who are not
purchasers. See id. A proper evaluation of the kind of loss and the person suffering such
loss dictates the proper form of recovery and answers, what Prosser calls, the resolution
of major issues in products liability claims. See id. § 95, at 678-79. This means that
loss premised upon either tort or contract laws will resolve some of the following
issues: whether the supplier is subject to strict liability; whether a "contract of sale or
other bargaining transaction" is effective to reduce, limit, or shield the seller's or
supplier's liability; whether defenses are available based on the conduct or misconduct
of the purchaser, user, or victim; whether a person, who is not a purchaser, may bring
suit against the manufacturer or seller; and what constitutes the "existence" of the cause
of action and the appropriate statute of limitations. Id. § 95, at 679.
19981
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(1) personal injuries,22 (2) physical harm to tangible things,
other than the assembled product .... (3) physical harm to or
destruction of the assembled product purchased by the first
purchaser for use,24 (4) physical harm to or destruction of a
product that was constructed with or repaired with the use of the
target seller's component part,25 and (5) direct economic loss
resulting from the purchase of an inferior product, and indirect
consequential loss, such as loss of profits .... 26
In addition, persons suffering losses as a result of the product's failure
generally are purchasers of the product,27 users who did not purchase
the product,21 or non-users who were merely present at the time of the
22. Personal injury resulting from a product grants individuals recovery in either
negligence, warranty, or strict liability in tort. See David W. Leebron, An Introduction
to Products Liability: Origins, Issues and Trends, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 395, 400
(1991).
23. Typically, loss to tangible things other than the assembled product is "other
property," separate from the product causing the harm, and is recoverable in theories of
tort law under negligence or strict liability. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867-68 (1986) ("[T]he manufacturer's duty of care [is]
broadened to include protection against property damage... [s]uch damage is considered
so akin to personal injury that the two are treated alike.").
24. According to the "economic loss doctrine," contract law determines recovery for
destruction of the product itself, as it is purchased by the buyer. See id. at 868.
Specifically, in East River, the Court held that "failure of the product to function
properly-is the essence of a warranty action, through which a contracting party can
seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain." See id.
25. Component parts and repairs to the product are part of the assembled product, and
injury suffered thereto is subject to contract law. See id. at 867. The Court in East River
held that because "all but the very simplest of machines have component parts, [a
contrary] holding would require a finding of 'property damage' in virtually every case
where a product damages itself. Such a holding would eliminate the distinction between
warranty and strict products liability." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Northern
Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981)).
26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 95, at 678. The Supreme Court in East River held
that "lost profits [are] essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its
bargain--traditionally the core concern of contract law." East River, 858 U.S. at 870.
Consequently, lost profits are a form of economic loss that are bound to the economic
loss doctrine set forth in East River. See id.
27. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 95, at 678. As noted previously, recovery
among purchasers of the product varies depending upon the character of loss suffered.
See id. § 95, at 678-79. Plaintiffs are bound to recover in contract or warranty for loss
that results in a product's failure to perform or lost profits-purely economic loss. See
id. § 95-95A, at 678-81. Economic loss arises out of express or implied obligations
made at the time of the product's sale pursuant to the parties' intent to independently
allocate losses among themselves. See id. In contrast, tort recovery is applicable where
loss occurs to the individual purchaser or other property used in conjunction with the
product. See id. Personal injury is subject to greater judicial interference because of the
pain and anguish that frequently accompany the loss. See id.
28. See id. § 95, at 678. When the plaintiff is not a purchaser of the product,
1998] Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.
product's failure.29
Multiple forms of loss prohibit the adoption of one type of remedy3°
in products liability cases. 3' Rather, alternative theories of recovery
apply depending on the nature, kind, and severity of the lOSS. 32
Application of the appropriate remedy, however, is often unclear and
inconsistent depending upon judicial and political preferences.33
Moreover, despite recent federal interference, products liability is
almost exclusively subject to state application and interpretation
without federal preemption. 34 Therefore, general remedies available in
products liability cases are subject to slight variation among
jurisdictions.35
B. Historical Battles Between Tort And Contract Remedies
Conflicts surrounding the application of either tort or contract law in
the products liability area are neither unique nor easily identifiable.
Early nineteenth century courts perceived privity36 as the primary
recovery has been described as difficult to justify. See Comment, Manufacturers'
Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract? 114
U. PA. L. REV. 539, 540-43 (1966) [hereinafter Manufacturers' Liability]. However,
with the increased use of tort law in products liability, courts permit implied warranty
actions by nonpurchasers who either have a close relationship to the purchaser or are
sufficiently foreseeable plaintiffs. See id. This recovery represents the extension of
protection to classes of non-purchasers. See id.
29. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 95, at 678. Non-users who did not purchase the
product are not parties to the warranty or contract between sellers and purchasers of the
product. See id. § 95-95A, at 678-81. Consequently, non-users sustaining personal or
property loss are unable to sufficiently protect against such loss and generally seek
relief in tort law. See id. § 95-95A, at 678-81.
30. See supra Part II.A.
3 1. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 2, § 95, at 678-79.
32. See id. Generally, the following theories represent the alternative forms of
recovery: "(1) strict liability in contract for breach of a warranty .... (2) negligence
liability in contract for breach of an express or implied warranty . . . , (3) negligence
liability in tort largely for physical harm to persons and tangible things, and (4) strict
liability in tort largely for physical harm to persons and tangible things." Id.
33. See Leebron, supra note 22, at 454-55 (discussing the emergence of tort reform
legislation in a number of states in response to expansion of strict products liability
law).
34. See id. at 452-54 (providing a brief overview of the complexities surrounding
federal and state product liability law resulting from federal regulation of product
manufacturing, marketing, distribution, warning, and testing).
35. See, e.g., 63B. AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1912, at 458 n.25 (1997)
(citing Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194 (Del. 1992) (noting that under
Delaware law, the economic loss doctrine acts as a complete bar to recovery even if
unequal bargaining power between consumers and commercial sellers exists)).
36. Privity is a "[d]erivative interest founded on, or growing out of, contract,
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determination of liability in products liability cases.37 Consequently,
privity limited the recovery of injured consumers, users of products,
and third parties.38 Persons without privity could not obtain relief for
losses that resulted from a product's failure to perform or a
manufacturer's negligence. 39 However, industrialization increased the
number of hazardous products, which in turn increased the number of
injured consumers. This increase in personal injuries and property
damage heightened judicial awareness of the need for tort liability and
consequently eroded away the privity defense.'
Specifically, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,41 Judge Cardozo
expressed a preference for remedies in tort law over contract law,
explicitly renouncing contract and privity as the only safeguards
against injury to "life and limb., 42 This concern for "life and limb"
43illustrated a preference for people rather than paper agreements. In
this pivotal ruling, Judge Cardozo held that when the "consequences
of negligence may be foreseen," contract remedies no longer serve as
the only outlet for relief.' Judge Cardozo stated, "[w]e have put aside
the notion that the duty to safeguard ... grows out of contract and
nothing else."4
5
connection, or bond of union between parties . . . connection or relationship which
exists between two or more contracting parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (6th
ed. 1990).
37. See Michael D. Lieder, Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of
Economic Loss: Building on Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L. REV. 937, 943 (1991).
Early U.C.C. interpretations extended the warranty "from the seller of goods to the
buyer, members of the buyer's family and household and the buyer's guests." Id. at 951.
3 8. See Robert L. Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability, 30
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 197, 198 (1997); see also Leebron, supra note 22, at 396
(discussing how the nineteenth century interpretation of privity limited recovery in tort,
negligence, and warranty to only direct purchasers of the product); Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 402 (Ex. 1842) (holding that the privity defense did not
make remote suppliers and manufacturers liable to injured users or consumers).
39. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 198. During this era, tort actions were unlikely due
to the natural application of already present warranty and contract provisions between
the manufacturer and the buyer that resulted from the sale of the goods. See id. Contract
and buyer-seller obligations dominated tort and negligence principles. See id.
40. See Lieder, supra note 37, at 942-44 (discussing the erosion of the privity defense
beginning with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916)).
41. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
42. See id. at 1053 (holding that liability for product defects arises out of products
that are "reasonably certain to place persons in peril when negligently made").
43. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 198-99 (quoting MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053).
44. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
45. See id. Judge Cardozo alluded to the principle that the law evolves and adapts to
changes in societal conditions and needs. See id. The needs and requirements of one
time are not necessarily the needs and requirements of future generations. See id.
1998] Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.
C. The Emergence of Tort Remedies as a Primary Form of Relief
Although Judge Cardozo's ruling in MacPherson represents one of
the earliest clashes between contract and tort law remedies in the area
of products liability,46 tort remedies did not surface as the primary
form of relief until several decades later.47 In Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co.,"8 Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, in a
concurring opinion, recommended extending tort liability to include
imposing absolute liability upon manufacturers.49 Specifically, Justice
Traynor reasoned that public policy correctly places liability upon
those best able to absorb the costs and guard against recurrence of the
hazard.5 ° Thus, Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola helped
to make the privity defense a creature of the past.5'
Compared to purchasers, manufacturers were better suited to handle
liability because of their ability to distribute costs as a natural
consequence of doing business and to insure against potential risk of
loss.52 Moreover, two decades after Escola, in 1963, a landmark
decision made recovery in tort for defective products the rule rather
than the exception.53 In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,54
46. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 199.
47. See id. at 198. Courts slowly suppressed the privity defense and imposed implied
warranty and strict liability against manufacturers of harmful products. See id.
48. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). The California Supreme Court held that in the case of a
waitress injured by a shattering soda bottle, res ipsa loquitur applied if the plaintiff had
control of the product at the time of the injury. See id. at 440. More importantly, in a
concurring opinion, Justice Traynor stated that strict liability, even in the absence of
negligence, provided the most reasonable means of relief. See id. at 440-442 (Traynor,
J., concurring).
49. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 199-200 (citing Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41
(Traynor, J., concurring)). Specifically, Justice Traynor, in his concurring opinion,
stated that a manufacturer is liable whether or not it is negligent because "public policy
demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards
to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market." Escola, 150 P.2d
at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
50. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
5 1. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 198-99. But see Lieder, supra note 37, at 944
(stating that in certain limited causes of action, privity remains a viable defense in five
jurisdictions).
52. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring); see also Leebron, supra
note 22, at 397-98 (discussing Justice Traynor's decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), as the first state decision to adopt strict
liability in tort for defective products).
53. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 200-01; see generally Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d at 900-01 (holding that the manufacturer of a power tool was
strictly liable in tort for personal injury resulting from the product's malfunction).
54. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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the California Supreme Court adopted strict liability in tort for
defective products and denied defenses in warranty or contract.55 The
court unanimously held that future product defect injuries required
decisions based upon strict liability in tort without reliance upon
warranty.56
State court decisions were not the only battlegrounds for the debate
over the application of tort or contract law in the area of products
liability. 57 In 1965, the American Law Institute adopted section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposed strict liability
upon the seller "engaged in the business of selling a product" when
harm occurred to the ultimate user, consumer, or his property. 58
Under Restatement section 402A, a manufacturer's liability attaches to
a product sold "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer."59  Despite the Restatement's extension of strict
liability in tort, however, a closer reading of the provision also exhibits
acknowledgment of contract and warranty theories.60 For example,
the comments to section 402A define a "defective condition" as a
"condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer., 6 1
Consequently, some commentators have noted that the Restatement
may be interpreted to govern to defects or conditions outside those
"contemplated"62 by the consumer, thus allowing warranty to remain
as the basis for recovery when the defect or condition could be within
the contemplation of the parties.63  Moreover, in defining
55. See id. at 899-901.
56. See id. at 901; see also Rabin, supra note 38, at 200-02 (stating that Greenman
and the creation of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provided the
foundation for future products liability actions).
57. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text; see also Greenman, 377 P.2d at
901 (identifying state court cases).
5 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The California Supreme Court
in Greenman provided the groundwork for the adoption of Section 402A one year later
by the American Law Institute. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 200-01. Section 402A
favors strict liability in tort over contract-warranty ideologies in products liability; yet,
it includes ambiguous language that recognizes the existence of warranty. See id. at
201-02. But see William L. Prosser, The Fall of The Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 803
(1966) ("[I]t must be understood that [section 402A] is a very different thing [,] ... it is
not subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to surround such sales.").
5 9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
60. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 201-02.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965); accord Rabin, supra note
38, at 201-02.
62. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 201-02. The author uses "contemplated" to refer to
consumer expectations and foreseeable losses arising through use of the product. See id.
63. See id.
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"unreasonably dangerous," comments to the Restatement provide that
the product "must be dangerous . . . beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it."'  Thus,
the Restatement language again makes reference to consumer
expectations and bargaining, which are at the very heart of warranty
and contract ideologies.65 This language illuminates the historical and
continuous struggle of whether to apply tort or contract law in
products liability actions that arise from a faulty product.66 Although
Section 402A makes strict liability the governing rule in products
liability, it does not entirely eliminate the presence of contract and
warranty remedies.67
D. Intangible and Economic Loss
Characterizations of economic loss are critical to the course of a
plaintiff's cause of action.68 Specifically, classifying loss as either
economic or "other property" loss determines the scope of recovery
and the underlying theory of the plaintiff's cause of action.69
Generally, a plaintiff attempts to characterize loss as "other property"
in order to heighten the opportunity for recovery through tort law,
either in strict liability or negligence.7 ° Economic loss, defined as loss
that is a "diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in
quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was
manufactured and sold,"'" restricts a plaintiff's recovery to contract
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
65. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 201-02.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J. Loftus, Riding the Choppy Waters of East River:
Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 260, 260 (1997). The
parameters of recovery vary between tort law and contract law. See id. Specifically, a
plaintiff recovering under tort law theories may recover greater financial compensation
for his loss than merely the amount previously stipulated in the warranty or contract.
See id. Therefore, plaintiffs who suffer serious financial losses generally attempt to
recover under tort law. See id.
69. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 95, at 678-79. When the phrase "underlying
theory" is used, this Note refers to recovery in either tort or contract and the rationale
employed by the court to permit recovery under either area of the law.
70. See Fox & Loftus, supra note 68, at 263 (stating that "[p]laintiffs often attempt
to circumvent the economic loss rule by characterizing their damages as 'property
damages' rather than 'economic loss"').
7 1. Id. at 263-64 (footnote omitted). Economic loss has also been defined as the cost
of "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective
product, or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damage
to other property." Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppinio and Sons, Inc.,
1998]
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law.72 Consequently, the nature of the loss is a bedrock issue,
fundamental to determining the basis and amount of recovery.73
1. The.Problem of the "Disappointed Purchaser"
Historically, manufacturers simply placed warranty or contract
provisions on products to place the consumer or user on notice of
potential risk of loss. However, society soon demanded greater
protection, beyond mere notice, against certain losses.74 Thus, in
products liability actions, tort law primarily arose out of policy choices
aimed at protecting persons and property from "dangerous and
defective products that cause 'the loss of time or health."' 75 Public
policy considerations dictated that the consequential costs arising from
such loss were too great a financial burden for any individual user or
consumer to bear.76 Furthermore, in contrast to consumers or users,
manufacturers were regarded as better able to bear the burden of the
costs associated with personal injury and property destruction because
of their ability to distribute such losses in their products' sale prices.77
Society's expectations of what a manufacturer's liability should be
when producing a defective product have changed because product
defects causing injury or loss of property threaten fundamental rights,
freedom of person and property, and exceed the scope of damages that
the individual consumer or user is able to contemplate at the time of
620 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966)).
72. See Fox & Loftus, supra note 68, at 260.
73. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 95, at 678-79.
74. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866
(1986) (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965)). "Certain
losses" refers to personal injury resulting in "the loss of time or health." Id. at 871
(citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring)).
75. Christopher Scott D'Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract
Warranty Law From Drowning In A Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 591, 594 (citing
East River, 476 U.S. at 871).
76. See East River, 476 U.S. at 871; accord D'Angelo, supra note 75, at 594. In East
River, the Court extracted this analysis from California Supreme Court Justice Traynor's
concurring opinion in Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). See East
River, 476 U.S. at 871. In his Escola analysis Traynor described losses to persons and
property as an "overwhelming misfortune" for which consumers are both unable and
unprepared to compensate. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). Thus,
persons and their property have priority over the financial burdens of the manufacturer
or seller. See East River, 476 U.S. at 871-72.
77. See D'Angelo, supra note 75, at 594 (footnote omitted). Specifically,
manufacturers make products that potentially have greater liability more expensive to
the individual users or consumers. See id.
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purchase.78
In contrast, under contract law, purchasers are barred from recovery
for any product failure that is outside the scope of the warranty or
contract.79 Specifically, the boundaries of the contract or warranty
impose limitations as to what remedies the "disappointed purchaser"'
may seek following the product's failure to perform properly.8 Risk
of loss arising from a product's insufficient quality or failure to
perform its intended function is an appropriate subject of negotiation at
the time of purchase between the user-purchaser and seller.82 Such
loss may be provided for individually within provisions of the
warranty or contract.83 Public policy concerns prompted the courts to
extend the application of tort remedies to cover socially unacceptable
injury to persons or property.84 However, economic loss neither
results in socially unacceptable loss 85 nor demands heightened
protection because individuals may adequately protect themselves at
the time of purchase through a contract or warranty.
86
Most importantly, however, supporters of the economic loss
doctrine advocate the stability and predictability inherent in
78. See id. at 593-94.
79. See East River, 476 U.S. at 872-73.
80. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 101(1), at 708. The disappointed purchaser is
defined as a person "suffering intangible commercial loss." Id. Essentially, the product
defect does not "endanger others," but merely fails to perform to the purchaser's
expectations. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. Although privity was championed as the source of a purchaser's recovery
for defects in a product, Prosser noted that where the user-purchaser is an ordinary
consumer instead of a commercial purchaser the same rationale is questionable. See id.
Consequently, Prosser suggested that privity can be disregarded and the "intent of each
seller would usually be controlling as regards [to] the scope of any guarantees related to
the condition of the goods sold." Id.
83. See East River, 476 U.S. at 872-73.
84. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)
(stating that strict liability in tort served as the basis for defective product actions
despite the existence of valid contracts or warranties); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 438-39 (Cal. 1944) (relaxing the requirements of res ipsa loquitur
and extending liability where the defendant lacked exclusive control over the instrument
causing harm); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 99-100 (N.J.
1960) (holding that a non-purchaser could recover in tort law for a defective steering
mechanism that caused injury to the non-purchaser of the vehicle); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050; 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (providing that personal injury must
occur to create negligent liability).
85. The author notes "unacceptable loss" as the loss to persons in contrast to losses
to property. Essentially, injury to the body outweighs financial losses. See KEETON ET
AL., supra note 2, § 95, at 678-79.
86. See Fox & Loftus, supra note 68, at 261 (discussing East River).
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manufacturer liability predicated upon contracts or warranties.87
Contract and warranty provisions provide manufacturers advance
notice of their obligations and the extent of their liability associated
with potential losses if the product fails to perform its intended
function.88 Essentially, the economic loss doctrine serves as the
manufacturer's "guard dog" against unlimited liability while preserving
the manufacturer's responsibility through independent contract
bargaining.89
2. The Warranty
Bargain transactions traditionally have involved little judicial
intervention.9" Bargaining parties desire the freedom to define the
boundaries of their obligations.91 Thus, early courts refused to hold
manufacturers liable for a defective product based upon the theory of
caveat emptor, more popularly known as "let the buyer beware. 92
Protection for intangible economic loss through warranty recovery
developed as a result of purchasers' frustrated expectations, even
when a product's failure did not result in injury to either persons or
property other than the product itself.93 Thus, either express
87. See id. ("[T]he economic loss doctrine promotes efficiency and predictability in
the commercial setting by establishing the boundaries of liability solely by reference to
the contract.").
88. See id. (discussing the limitless liability that would arise without the economic
loss doctrine). Without contract or warranty limitations, the manufacturer/seller would
be unable to determine its potential liability and subsequently account for future losses
in the price of its goods or services. See id. The manufacturer/seller would be forced to
blindly estimate future liabilities and base the cost of its goods upon this unfair and
uncertain estimation. See id.
89. See id. Commercial parties are able to define the terms of their own obligations
within the accepted limits of contract law. See id.
90. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 95A, at 679. Prosser states that "[tihe courts
in early America adopted the notion of caveat emptor so that there was initially no
liability of a seller of a product on any theory-tort or contract." Id.
91. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-3, at 5-6
(3d ed. 1987).
92. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990). The term is applicable to "sales of
consumer goods where strict liability, warranty, and other consumer protection laws
protect the consumer-buyer." Id. Specifically, the buyer must examine and determine
independently the merits of the sale and the reliability of the product purchased. See id.;
see also Leebron, supra note 22, at 395-96 (noting the rule that parties enjoyed freedom
to determine their contractual obligations).
93. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 95A, at 679-80 (stating that "pressure
developed for the protection of the intangible economic interest of those making
bargaining transactions ... result[ing] in the development of the warranty theory of
recovery").
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warranties,94 arising from statements made by the seller at the time of
the transaction, or implied warranties,95 arising from the nature of the
transaction itself, governed recovery.96 Warranties manifest a
manufacturer's confidence in the reliability of his or her product and
expose potential risks that accompany the use of the product.97
Generally, statutory laws govern the required provisions and terms
applicable to these warranties.98 Consequently, parties independently
agree upon the terms of their warranty obligations, with the exception
of some limitations mandated by governing commercial statutes. 99
3. Defining the "Boundaries"-The Creation of the East River
Doctrine
Determination of both economic loss and the amounts recoverable
from this loss depend upon the actual loss caused by the defective
product. Modern courts define economic loss in two forms: (1) loss to
the actual product, and (2) loss to property subsequently attached to
the product.'00 The type of recovery and recognition of this loss
94. See William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The
Ascendancy Of Contract Over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 733-34 (1990) (citing
U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(a) (1987)). Express warranties are an "affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain." Id. Moreover, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "any
sample or model which is . . . made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the description." Id. § 2-313(l)(b).
95. See Jones, supra note 94, at 733-34 (citing U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1987)). The
Uniform Commercial Code provides that a "warranty that goods shall be merchantable is
implied ... if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." U.C.C. § 2-
314(1) (1987). Furthermore, "[if a] seller has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is . . . an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose." Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-315).
96. See Jones, supra note 94, at 733.
97. See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
917, 932-33 (1966).
98. See U.C.C. § 1-101 (1987).
99. See id. The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in most states,
governs the obligations and limitations between commercial contracting parties. See
id.
100. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
867 (1986) (stating no products liability claim lies when a commercial party alleges
injury only to the product itself that results only in economic loss); Pennsylvania Glass
Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173-74 (3d Cir. 1981) (allowing
recovery for hazardous defect in truck as the sort of physical injury to property
compensable under tort law); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150-51 (Cal.
1965) (finding in an action for negligence that manufacturer's liability is limited to
damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for only economic loss); REM
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developed slowly.
a. Setting the Stage-Seely v. White Motor Co.
Although persons who suffer intangible economic losses can
recover damages under express or implied warranties, such recovery is
limited to the economic loss and generally does not include recovery
for tort claims.' 1 This premise was illustrated as early as 1965 in
Seely v. White Motor Co.,"°2 where the California Supreme Court
denied recovery to the plaintiffs against a truck manufacturer when the
only damage arose out of the product's failure to perform up to the
buyer's expectations.'0 3 In this pivotal ruling, the California Supreme
Court distinguished economic loss from physical injury or loss to
property other than the product itself." Thus, in California, prior to a
sale, consumers must bargain for the allowance of recovery in the
event that the product fails to perform to the customer's
expectations. 105 The approach adopted by the California Supreme
Court in Seely governed products liability claims involving economic
loss until the United States Supreme Court expanded the rule in East
River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.'
°6
Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 563 A.2d 128, 132 (Pa. Super. 1989) (holding that
negligence and strict liability theories did not apply in an action between commercial
enterprises where damages were only to the property itself).
101. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, §§ 96-98, 681-694. Tortious liability includes
theories predicated upon strict liability or negligence. See id.
102. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
103. Id. at 150-51. Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, concluded that
"[t]he distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and
warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the 'luck' of
one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury." Id. Moreover, in
negligence actions, "a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical
injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone." Id.; see also D'Angelo, supra
note 75, at 593 (discussing Seely and the historical distinction between economic loss
and physical injury in product liability claims).
104. See Seely, 403 P.2d at 151. The majority opinion describes economic loss as
the failure of the product to match the consumer's "economic expectations," loss for
which manufacturers are not liable, outside of the warranty. See id. However,
manufacturers are liable for physical injury involving safety and risk of harm to users.
See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A); see also Manufacturers'
Liability, supra note 28, at 542-549 (discussing Seely and its impact upon economic
loss and manufacturer liability).
105. See Seely, 403 P.2d at 151 (stating that a consumer "can, however, be fairly
charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations unless
the manufacturer agrees that it will"). Chief Justice Traynor notes that inequality in the
parties' bargaining power does not bar limitations of liability between the manufacturer
and purchaser. See id.
106. See D'Angelo, supra note 75, at 593 (discussing the wide acceptance among
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b. The East River Doctrine-East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc.
The United States Supreme Court's East River decision addressed
the issue of denying recovery for economic loss not covered by a
contract. 0 7 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, noted that "the
failure of the product to function properly ... is the essence of a
warranty action, through which a contracting party can seek to recoup
the benefit of its bargain."' 8 In this admiralty decision, the Court
evaluated "land-based"'0 9 interpretations defining economic loss and
held that economic loss is "purely economic" since neither the person
nor "other property" is damaged." 0 Further, the opinion in East River
criticized the minority view, as described in Santor v. A&M
Karaghesian, as too "indeterminate" because it failed to provide
manufacturers with certainty regarding their liability for loss caused by
defective products."' Moreover, the East River holding criticized
Santor for failing to entirely bar recovery for purely economic loss.112
jurisdictions of the Seely approach until the Court's East River opinion); see, e.g.,
Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 771 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying, under
Indiana law, an action in tort for recovery of purely economic losses); Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1247-48 (Fla.
1993) (providing that, in the case of homeowners, the economic loss rule bars recovery
in tort law for purely economic losses in the absence of personal or property damage).
But see Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 329
(Alaska 1981) (stating that in products strict liability actions, plaintiffs may recover for
injury to the product itself if the loss is a "proximate result of a dangerous defect").
107. See generally East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
871-75 (1986). In East River, the Court denied the plaintiffs recovery in both
negligence and strict liability for the cost of lost profits and repairs to ship turbines that
were defectively installed by the defendants. See id. at 875-76. The Court held that in
the absence of personal injury or damage to other property, tort laws were inapplicable
regardless of whether the defect arose suddenly or gradually. See id. at 870.
108. Id. at 868.
109. See id. at 868-70. The Court uses the term "land-based" to non-admiralty
decisions. See id. at 870. Currently, however, admiralty law generally adheres to "land-
based" products liability law. See id. at 865.
110. See id. at 870 (stating that "since by definition no person or other property is
damaged, the resulting loss is purely economic. Even when the harm to the product
itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair
costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to
receive the benefit of its bargain ....").
111. See id. at 870-71; see also Lieder, supra note 37, at 952-53. Santor exposed
manufacturers to indefinite ranges and amounts of liability. See Lieder, supra note 37, at
953-54; Santor v. A&M Karaghesian, 207 A.2d 305, 312-13 (N.J. 1965) (holding that a
manufacturer's duty to make non-defective products includes injury to the product itself,
whether or not the defect created an unreasonable risk of harm).
112. See East River, 476 U.S. at 870-71. The court in East River rejected the Santor
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Consequently, the Court adhered to traditional notions of judicial
restraint regarding commercial transactions and concluded that
manufacturers are not liable in either negligence or strict liability for a
product that injures only itself.1"3 The Court pointed out that such a
loss is "essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of
its bargain-traditionally the core concern of contract law. 114  The
Court further reasoned that expanding a manufacturer's liability to
include both contract and tort remedies, where the loss is purely
economic, would result in excessive and unreasonable liability.'
15
Accordingly, the Court found that confining the buyer to the "full
benefit" of the bargain is a reasonable limitation upon liability where
the loss is only economic. 16
c. Subsequent Interpretations of the East River Doctrine
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in REM Coal Co. v. Clark
Equipment Co. 117 paralleled the reasoning in East River to distinguish
among circumstances that require either contract or tort remedies in the
non-admiralty context.'18 Following East River, the Pennsylvania
approach, finding that its broad scope of liability for injury to a product itself caused an
unnecessary overlap between contract law and tort law. See id. Further, the court stated
that this minority view "failed to account for the need to maintain a realistic limitation
on damages." Id. at 871.
113. See id. at 858; see also supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
114. East River, 476 U.S. at 873 (citations omitted). Generally, commercial parties
do not have disparities in bargaining power that bias or taint the allocation of the risk
of loss. See id. (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (1960)).
For a discussion of the underlying reasons why tort law is predominant in products
liability compared to contract law, see supra notes 48-68 and accompanying text. See
also supra notes 82-99 and accompanying text (discussing the loss that is traditionally a
core concern of contract law).
115. See East River, 476 U.S. at 871. Justice Blackmun concluded that warranty
actions inherently limit liability based upon the scope of the warranty between the
parties. See id. In contrast, tort actions "could subject the manufacturer to damages of
an indefinite amount." Id. Specifically, manufacturer-sellers cannot foresee persons
later in the chain of distribution and provide for liability in the case of loss. See id.; see
also Jones, supra note 94, at 752 (discussing the East River doctrine in the context of
strict liability and negligence).
116. See East River, 476 U.S. at 873.
117. 563 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
118. Id. at 129; see also Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 831 (1996)
(discussing recovery for injury caused by the user's fault); Trans States Airlines v. Pratt
& Whitney Canada, Inc., 86 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Illinois law as
embracing conflicting approaches to the economic loss doctrine); Sea-Land Serv., Inc.
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 134 F.3d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1998) (providing an admiralty case noting
East River and citing to King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051 (3d Cir. 1988), for
the doctrine that the "object of the bargain" is the object bargained for by the plaintiff
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Superior Court concluded that tort law applies to losses caused by
unsafe products when the buyer is unable to contract for this loss at the
time of the sale. 19 However, warranties are specific remedies for
losses that can be contemplated at the time of the bargain, such as
economic loss or lost profits. 2 ° Specifically, the Court held that
public policy does not demand interference in the bargain when there is
an opportunity to guard against losses that result from "disappointed
expectations."' 12 1 Consumers may separately provide for remedies
within sales contracts to shield themselves from damage resulting from
the products failure to perform as desired. 22 However, the distinction
drawn in East River between the product and "other property" was
equally as elusive as "disappointed expectations."' 123  As a result,
subsequent federal appellate courts were left to grapple with the
meaning of "the product" and what this term includes. 24
4. Defining "The Product"
The economic loss doctrine bars tort recovery for loss arising out of
the product's failure to perform its intended function. 12' Economic
loss frequently arises out of either complete destruction of the product
to determine other property); Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d
1094, 1099 (8th Cir. 1996) (predicting that North Dakota would apply economic loss
doctrine so as to preclude tort liability when, at the time of contracting, commercial
purchasers could have foreseen damage to nearby property); 2-J Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d
539, 543 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting the "other property" determination in East River and
Saratoga and the "other property" extension to inventory stored inside the property
when the property collapses).
119. See REM Coal Co., 563 A.2d at 133 (stating agreement with the East River
rationale).
120. See id. at 129 (providing that "the goals of tort theories of recovery are not
implicated in a product malfunction case involving only economic losses. A contract
action, on the other hand, is perfectly suited to providing an adequate remedy for such
losses").
121. See id. (citing East River, 476 U.S. at 873).
122. See id. at 133.
123. See infra note 128 (providing cases that interpret the meaning of "other
property" following the East River decision).
124. See, e.g., Nicor Supply Ships Assocs. v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 501,
506 (5th Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment order of district court and allowing
plaintiff to proceed in tort under the theory that property added one year after purchase
was "other property"); King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding that recovery in tort is denied for injury to the product itself); Shipco 2295,
Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that the
product is the object of the bargain between the parties).
125. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic
loss doctrine.
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or product failure that renders the product "worthless." 126 However,
the doctrine of economic loss does not proscribe tort recovery when
"other property" is damaged because "other property" is considered
distinct from the product and recoverable in tort law. 127  Yet, the
determination of whether injury has occurred solely to the product
itself is a source of confusion.128 For this reason, litigation arises out
of disputes over the scope of "the product" and whether the product or
"other property" sustained the injury. 129
Determining the form of relief in products liability actions requires
an examination of the character of the loss. 3° The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in King v. Hilton-Davis held that, in determining the nature
of the loss, courts must look to the "product purchased by the
plaintiff'-what the plaintiff bargained for and expected through the
sale, in contrast to the product sold by the defendant.' In reaching its
conclusion, the Third Circuit highlighted the importance of evaluating
the contracted product and whether the product was a "single
126. See Jones, supra note 94, at 734 ("A breach of warranty may result in product
failure so complete as to render the product worthless.").
127. See Fox & Loftus, supra note 68, at 264 (discussing "other property" in light of
East River and noting the confusion among courts attempting to distinguish what
constitutes "other property").
128. See id.; see, e.g., Hininger v. Case Corp., 23 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a combine purchaser could not recover in tort for lost profits and repair
costs against the component part manufacturer according to the economic loss doctrine);
American Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool and Machine, Inc., 767 F.2d 446, 446-47
(8th Cir. 1985) (providing that insurance carriers could not maintain action in strict
liability or negligence against component part suppliers for economic loss); Bowling
Green Mun. Utils. v. Thomasson Lumber Co., 902 F. Supp. 134, 136 (W.D. Ky. 1995)
(holding that "tort and contract law occupy two separate and distinct fields"); Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 835 F. Supp 1195, 1201 (D. Haw. 1993)
(asserting that tort recovery is permissible for injury to the existing product where
injury is caused by component acquired later and added to existing product); Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla.
1993) (stating that a homeowner could not recover in tort for economic loss); Utah Int'l,
Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 775 P.2d 741, 744 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
damage for economic loss in commercial setting is only recoverable in contract
actions); Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 645 N.E. 2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y.
1995) (providing that a downstream commercial purchaser could not recover in tort from
the original manufacturer for damages to the product itself because the buyer had
opportunities to allocate loss through warranty).
129. See supra note 9 for a definition of "other property."
130. See generally King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051-52 (3d Cir. 1988)
(noting that recovery against a component part supplier under tort law negligence or
strict liability is barred where the product merely injures itself).
13 1. Id. at 1051 (interpreting East River to mean that "it is the character of the
plaintiff's loss that determines the nature of the available remedies").
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integrated unit" at the time of the transaction.'3 2 Consequently, when a
purchaser demands relief against a manufacturer for damage to the
product, the content of the product is determined by what was
bargained for by the plaintiff as shown by the provisions of the
contract or warranty.1
33
Additionally, the King Court interpreted decisions involving the
classification of component parts of the product installed before the
product's sale. 3 4 These holdings unequivocally defined component
parts of the product as part of the product itself and thus permitted
recovery only in contract law.'3 5 In defining the product and its
component parts, these courts held that the product was the "object of
the contract," meaning the "finished product bargained for by the
buyer."' 116 Therefore, a component part that damages the product
damages the entire product merely because both the product and the
component part are characterized as a "single integrated product."' 13 7
Thus, the completed product defines the purchaser's scope of relief in
that only by examining the bargain sought by the plaintiff can the
132. See id. at 1052. The court focused upon the "bargained-for expectations" of the
plaintiffs to determine the scope of what the "plaintiffs contracted to buy" and
subsequently concluded that the purchase included a "single integrated unit." Id.; see
also supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
133. See id.; see also East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S.
858, 866-69 (1986).
134. See King, 855 F.2d at 1052 (citing Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards,
Inc., 825 F.2d 925, 928 (5th Cir 1987) (providing that damage to component parts was
not damage to "other property"); American Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool & Mach.,
Inc., 767 F.2d 446, 447-48 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that tort law does not apply to
economic loss); Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th
Cir. 1982) ("[S]trict liability in tort does not apply between large commercial entities
who have bargained-for allocation of risk."). The King court noted several federal
appellate decisions that barred recovery against a component part supplier for purely
economic loss. See King, 855 F.2d at 1052. The court concurred with those opinions
that held that component parts are part of the bargained for product. See id. In other
words, purchasers do not individually bargain for each component of the product in light
of the many parts inherent to purchased products. See id.
135. See id. The Fifth Circuit, in Shipco, considered the holding in East River that
denied tort recovery for economic loss caused from damage to the product itself and
stated that it "raises the question--what is the product. In attempting to identify the
product, our analysis leads us to ask what is the object of the contract or bargain that
governs the rights of the parties? The completed vessels were obviously the objects of
the contract." Shipco, 825 F.2d at 928.
136. King, 855 F.2d at 1052 (citing Shipco, 825 F.2d at 925). The Shipco court held
that the product is the "finished product bargained for by the buyer." This interpretation
has become widely recognized as the "object of the bargain rule." See Shipco, 825 F.2d
at 928, 930.
137. See King, 855 F.2d at 1052.
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product be defined. 138
E. The Nature of the Transaction:
Commercial Transactions and Section 402A
Tort law in products liability cases exists because society insists on
protecting the susceptible consumer. 139  These societal pressures
promote the shifting of loss to the manufacturer of products through
theories of strict liability, regardless of the plaintiff's causal
contribution to the injury.O Some critics of the shift, however, argue
that the nature of the consumer, commercial or individual, demands
different theories of liability.14' For example, early case law held that
commercial consumers require less loss-shifting because of the parties'
equal economic strength in bargaining, ability to bargain
specifications, and ability to negotiate risk of loss from defects.142 In
spite of such conclusions, current state and federal laws fail to provide
definitive answers regarding the theory of recovery for the commercial
consumer.
As a result of this ambiguity, several interpretations premise
recovery upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A which
governs liability of commercial sellers. 144  Section 402A of the
Restatement imposes strict liability upon sellers who sell "product[s] in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his [or her] property . . . ." if "the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and it is expected to and does reach
138. See id.
139. See supra notes 36-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the creation of
tort law in products liability and the erosion of contract based recovery.
140. See supra notes 36-67 and accompanying text; see also Saratoga Fishing Co. v.
J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783, 1786 (1997), rev'g, Saratoga Fishing Co. v.
Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing state law practice of
distinguishing between modified products and defective products).
141. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1791 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I doubt, however,
whether leaving the market chain of distribution ought to be so momentous an event for
the purpose at hand . . . [s]o long as the plaintiff is a commercial entity ... ").
142. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976). "[P]roducts liability does not apply as between parties who: (1)
deal in a commercial setting; (2) from positions of relatively equal economic strength;
(3) bargain the specifications of the product; and (4) negotiate concerning the risk of
loss from defects in it." Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422
F.2d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 1970).
143. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (providing a strict liability
rule for sellers of products).
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the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold."' 45 Critics of section 402A point out the section's
failure to address several poignant issues, such as the type of product,
defense issues, contributory fault, or economic lOSS.1 46 Moreover,
judicial interpretations of section 402A restrict its application to
solutions where "the purposes it seeks to serve dictate its
application." '147
The "purpose it seeks to serve" generally means cases of apparent
inequalities in bargaining power that make contract-warranty recovery
infeasible. 4 8 For example, the Ninth Circuit Court concurred with the
restriction of strict liability in the commercial context in East River,
when it denied tort recovery against a commercial manufacturer for
purely economic losses. 149 Consequently, where only economic loss
results from the defective nature of the product and the seller is
commercial, courts must decipher the appropriate form of relief
without explicit guidance from section 402A. 5 ' The Supreme Court
has not resolved the issue of whether similar reasoning is applicable to
the commercial consumer who is presumably knowledgeable and able
to guard against risk of loss when bargaining for the product."'
III. DIscusSION
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 152 the United
States Supreme Court determined whether a second user may recover
145. Id. The Restatement expressly denotes commercial sellers by providing that
"[t]he rule does not, however, apply to the occasional seller of food or other such
products who is not engaged in that activity as a part of his [or her] business." Id. at
cmt. f.
146. See Rabin, supra note 38, at 204-05. The author discusses the premature
creation of section 402A and the inherent problems with its "all or nothing approach"
to dangerous products. See id. Specifically, the author describes a comment to section
402A recording "unavoidably unsafe products" as a source of "confusion." Id.
147. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 447 (9th Cir. 1983).
148. See supra notes 36-67 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying
principles of tort law in products liability and the decline of contract based recovery).
149. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir.
1995), rev'd sub nom. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783
(1997) (citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871
(1986)).
150. See generally Rabin, supra note 38, at 205 (stating that "[t]he section also fails
to address product injuries that cause only economic loss .... ).
151. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783, 1790-91
(1997), rev'g, Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. 117 S. Ct. 1783 (1997).
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in tort for additional equipment added to the original product by the
initial user when such additional equipment is destroyed because of a
defect in the original product. 53  More specifically, the Court
determined whether this additional property is "other property"'' 54 and
thus distinctly separate from the original product, or rather, part of the
original product as a consequence of the sale.'55 The Supreme Court's
classification of the additional equipment as either "other property" or
the original product was important to determine the applicability of the
economic loss rule and the availability of tort remedies to second
users.
156
A. Facts Of The Case
In Saratoga, the owner of a steel-hull fishing ship sought relief in
tort against the original manufacturer of the ship, J.M. Martinac &
Co., and the designer of the hydraulic system, Marco Seattle Inc. 57
The fishing ship, originally outfitted and supplied by J.M. Martinac
Co., was sold to Joseph Madruga ("Madruga"), the initial user. 158
The original ship, placed in the line of distribution by J.M. Martinac
Co., included a hydraulic system designed by Marco Seattle, Inc.
159
Upon purchasing the ship, the initial user, Madruga, installed
additional equipment, consisting of a skiff, net, and communications
and navigational electronics, to the ship for its specific use as a tuna
seiner.160 The initial user, Madruga, used the ship for approximately
three years prior to selling the ship to Plaintiff, Saratoga Fishing
153. See id. at 1785.
154. See id. at 1789 (concluding that the additional property was "other property");
see also supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. "Other property" refers to property
loss other than the purchased product. See supra note 10.
155. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1785. At issue before the Court was under what
circumstances the term "other property" includes property added to the defective product
by some earlier buyer in the chain of distribution, not by the plaintiff-purchaser. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. J.M. Martinac & Co., a small custom builder of steel hull tuna seiners,
built the fishing vessel and installed the hydraulic system that subsequently
malfunctioned. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1435
(9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S.
Ct. 1783 (1997). Marco Seattle Inc. designed the hydraulic system at the request of the
initial user and oversaw the integration of the system into the ship prior to its sale to
the initial purchaser-user. See id.
158. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1785. Joseph Madruga, the initial purchaser and
seller to the plaintiff, purchased seven like steel hull tuna seiners. See id. at 1790
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 1785.
160. See id. This property at issue was the "other property." See id.
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Company. 6' During Saratoga's ownership, the ship's engine room
caught fire and the ship sank, resulting in total destruction of the ship
and its contents. 162 Accordingly, Saratoga Fishing Company filed an
admiralty tort action against both the manufacturers of the ship and the
designer of the hydraulic system, J.M. Martinac & Co. and Marco
Seattle Inc., respectively, for damages to the additional equipment
added by the initial user, Madruga.'63
B. The Lower Court Opinions
The district court held that the defective design of the hydraulic
system primarily caused the damage to the ship and awarded recovery
to Saratoga Fishing Company for the loss of the "other property"
added by the initial user after the first purchase of the ship. 164 The
district court concluded that Defendants were strictly liable for the
defective hydraulic system despite their adherence to marine standards
and practices in their manufacturing. 165 The district court, however,
did not include within Saratoga Fishing Company's damages the cost
of replacement parts installed by Saratoga after its purchase of the
ship. 166 Additionally, the district court reduced the damages, finding
that Saratoga Fishing Company's actions were a contributing cause of
the fire; the ship was damaged as a result of Saratoga's poor
maintenance, misuse, and independent modifications to the ship's
hydraulic system after its purchase of the ship. 167
161. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.
1995), rev'd sub nom. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783
(1997). Saratoga purchased the ship "'as is' . . . with no warranty other than that 'said
vessel and her appurtenances will be in operable condition upon delivery of the Bill of
Sale."' Respondents' Brief at 9, Saratoga, (No. 95-1764) (quoting exhibit to trial
transcript).
162. See Saratoga, 69 F.3d at 1436.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1437 (explaining the district court's holding). The recovery was
reduced by two-thirds due to Saratoga Fishing Company's comparative fault. See id. The
district court determined that the additional equipment added by the initial user was
"other property," and not part of the original ship. See id. Included as losses were the
following: the tuna catch, seine, skiff, fuel, equipment, payments by Saratoga to the
crew for their personal property losses, the cost of the rescue and certain cash carried on
board. See id.
165. See id. at 1437.
166. See id. at 1437. Additionally, the district court denied damages for the cost of
the ship's hull. See id. The Ninth Circuit agreed that damages to the ship's hull were
part of the original product between the initial user and seller and recoverable only under
warranty-contract law. See id. at 1446.
167. See id. at 1442. At trial, the district court concluded that the ship's engineer
1998]
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Reversing the holding of the district court, the Ninth Circuit held
that the additional equipment was part of the product when it was
resold to Saratoga, the second user.1 68  Therefore, the added
equipment destroyed by the fire was not "other property" but was
rather "part of the defective product that itself caused the harm. 169 In
its holding, the court relied upon the East River decision, which drew
distinctions between the damage caused to the "'product itself' and
damage to a 'person or other property.' '1 70  Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the second user possessed the opportunity to
demand a warranty from the initial user; therefore, the failure to obtain
protection through a warranty was Saratoga Fishing Company's
"must have been aware" that the hydraulic system needed replacing and that the system
should not have been operated on the day of the incident. See id. at 1443 n.10.
Accordingly, the district court found that Saratoga Fishing Company's alterations or
independent modifications of the ship's hydraulic system led in part to the fire that
ignited in the engine room and led to the ship's destruction. See id. at 1442-43.
168. See id. at 1445. In the opinion, two members of the panel voted in favor of
Defendants, J.M. Martinac Co. and Marco Seattle Inc., while the third member of the
panel, Judge Noonan, dissented and stated that the decision conflicted with both prior
Fifth Circuit decisions and the East River doctrine. See id. at 1447 (Noonan, J.,
dissenting). Specifically, Judge Noonan concluded that the additional equipment was
"other property," recoverable in tort law and that defendants' liability should not
decrease with resale of a product when it would have been liable for the same damages
without the resale of the product. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting).
169. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783, 1785
(1997), rev'g, Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)
(explaining the Ninth Circuit's holding). In determining that the additional equipment
added by the initial user was "other property," the Ninth Circuit relied upon the Supreme
Court's reasoning in East River. See Saratoga, 69 F.3d at 1444-45. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that to determine the bounds of "other property," the Supreme Court in East
River focused upon the agreement between the parties to the suit, the charterers and the
owners. See id. The Ninth Circuit determined that because the charterers in East River
were treated as "equivalent to a second buyer," the Supreme Court focused on the contract
between the first buyer and the second buyer to determine the confines of "other
property" and the original product. See id. This reasoning flowed from the fact that the
Supreme Court did not evaluate the contract between the original seller and the first
buyer to interpret the charterers' agreement. See id. Therefore, because the Supreme
Court in East River would not "extricate the parties from their bargain," the Ninth
Circuit decided not to provide tort remedies to this second buyer, Saratoga, when the
agreement between the first buyer, the initial user, and Saratoga could determine the
remedies for loss. Id. (citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476
U.S. 858, 875 (1986)).
170. See id. (quoting East River, 476 U.S. at 870). The Ninth Circuit relied upon the
East River doctrine to determine that economic loss, such as repairs, lost value, or
decreased profits, is traditionally a concern for warranty-contract law. See id.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the East River doctrine was specifically
particular to purchasers in a commercial context who seek recovery for things that
should be "sought ... through a contract or warranty claim." Id.
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independent loss. 171 The object of the bargain between Saratoga
Fishing Company and the Defendants provided the basis of
determining the product itself and "other property" recoverable in tort
law.172 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, in commercial bargains,
characterizing additional equipment added after the original sale as
"other property" would increase the manufacturer's liability beyond the
scope intended by the Supreme Court in East River.173
C. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
uncertainty surrounding the application of tort or contract remedies to a
second plaintiff-user who suffers damage to additional equipment
supplied by the initial user-purchaser. Additionally, the Court sought
to properly characterize the added equipment as either part of the
original product or "other property."' 174 In a 6-3 opinion authored by
Justice Breyer, the Court held that additional equipment added by the
initial user-purchaser is "other property" and not part of the original
product in the context of a second plaintiff-user, and consequently is
recoverable in tort."' Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and
O'Connor, dissented and stated that the economic loss rule barred
recovery to the second plaintiff-user because the loss was essentially to
the product itself. 176 However, Justice O'Connor concurred with the
Court's decision to grant certiorari, thereby disagreeing with Justices
Scalia's and Thomas' shared opinion that the Court should have
denied certiorari because the issue was neither adequately developed in
the state courts nor a suitable subject within the Supreme Court's realm
171. See id. (stating specifically that "[tihe parties chose not to include a seller's
warranty, and we will not second guess their choice"); see also supra Part II.D. and
accompanying text discussing independent loss.
172. See Saratoga, 69 F.3d at 1445. The Ninth Circuit, in addition to relying on East
River, relied upon Nicor Supply Ships Assoc. v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 501
(5th Cir. 1989), to determine that the object of the bargain is the subject of the sale
between the buyer and the seller. See id. at 1444.
173. See id. at 1445 (stating that "[it would indeed be anomalous for the
shipbuilder's liability to increase every time the vessel was modified and resold").
174. See generally Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. 1783 (1997) (discussing the limitations
upon tort damages a plaintiff-second user may recover for physical damage to property
caused by a defective product where the property damaged is additional equipment added
by an initial user in the chain of distribution).
175. See id. at 1789. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
and Ginsburg joined the majority opinion delivered by Justice Breyer. See id. at 1785.
176. See id. at 1792 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
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of expertise."'
1. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
ruling and allowed Saratoga Fishing Company to recover for damages
caused to the skiff, net, and communications and navigational
equipment.178 The Court held that equipment added by the initial user,
Madruga, before the sale to the second user, was "other property" and
distinct from the product that itself caused the harm.179 Essentially, the
Court determined that resale maintains the manufacturer's liability for
damage to equipment added after the initial sale in spite of the
product's movement through chains of ownership.' 0
The Court distinguished its prior holding in East River 8' by finding
177. See id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated "I do not
disagree with our decision to grant certiorari in this case, but I agree with Justice
Scalia-and for the reasons he states-that we should affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In contrast, Justice Scalia concluded that it
would have been "[b]etter to have followed some state-court pilots than to proceed on
our own-and even, perhaps, to lead state courts aground." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. See id.
179. See id. (holding that the "equipment at issue here, added to the ship by a user
after an initial sale to that Initial User, [is] not part of the product ... that itself caused
the harm").
180. See id. at 1787. The majority reasoned that had the loss occurred when the
product with the added equipment remained in the initial buyer-user's hands, the "loss of
the added equipment could have been recovered in tort." Id. Moreover, the Court "found
no suggestion in state (or in federal law) that these results would change with a
subsequent sale." Id.
181. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
Specifically, the Saratoga majority did not overrule the opinion in East River but merely
granted certiorari to resolve "uncertainty about the proper application of East River."
Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1786. In East River, the Court held that an admiralty tort
plaintiff, a commercial party, cannot "recover for the physical damage the defective
product causes to the 'product itself'; but the plaintiff can recover for physical damage
the product causes to 'other property."' Id. at 1785 (citing the holding in East River).
The Supreme Court in Saratoga discussed the creation of the East River doctrine as a
product of conflicting principles of recovery in products liability law:
East River arose at the intersection of two principles that govern recovery in
many commercial cases involving defective products. The first principle is
that tort law in this area ordinarily. . . permits recovery from a manufacturer
and others in the initial chain of distribution for foreseeable physical harm to
property caused by product defects .... The second principle is that tort law
in this area ordinarily . . . does not permit recovery for purely economic
losses, say, lost profits.
Id. at 1786 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court in East River intended the first principle to permit recovery where
the product caused physical harm. See id. In contrast, the second principle envelopes
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that the Plaintiff's recoverable damages did not arise from the failure of
the product to perform its originally intended function. 8 2 The
product's intended function attached at the time of the initial sale
between the manufacturer and the initial user. 8 3 Additional equipment
supplied to the product by the initial user neither altered the product's
intended function nor changed the characterization of the additional
equipment as "other property."'"
The Court held that application of the Ninth Circuit's ruling
expanded tort immunity beyond its intended scope.'85 Distinctions
between the product and additional items used with the product permit
recovery for damage to the additional items resulting from the defective
product to either the initial user or to subsequent users. 8 6 Essentially,
had the ship sunk while in Madruga's ownership, the additional
equipment undeniably would have been recoverable in tort.'87 In
making this determination, the Supreme Court relied upon multiple
state court holdings that permit tort recovery for harm to items used
injury to the product itself because it was a kind of economic loss. See id. Essentially, a
product that destroys itself is equivalent to "a product that does not work properly or
does not work at all." Id.
182. See id. at 1786-87. The product's intended function is determined when the
property is "placed [into] . ..the stream of commerce by selling it to an Initial User."
Id. at 1786. Because the additional equipment was not part of the sale between the initial
buyer and Defendants, it was not part of the product that determines the product's
intended function. See id. at 1786-87.
183. See id. In the case of Saratoga, at the time of the ship's construction the
manufacturer and original user-buyer outfitted the ship to operate as a tuna seiner. See
Respondents' Brief at 5, Saratoga (No. 95-1764). However, the ship was delivered as an
"incomplete fishing vessel" that required additions such as a net, skiff, and other
navigational and communications electronics to complete its assembly as an
operational fishing vessel. See id. at 5-6. Consequently, it was not until the initial
user-buyer outfitted the ship with these items that the ship was put to sea and operated as
a tuna seine. See id.
184. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1786.
185. See id. at 1786-87. The Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit relied
upon East River to hold that the plaintiff could have "asked the seller to warrant" the
product at the time of the second sale. Id. at 1786. The Ninth Circuit, therefore,
reasoned that because the second user could have asked for a warranty from the initial
user-buyer, the product was determined by what was purchased by the plaintiff. See id.
Moreover, what was purchased by Saratoga, including the additional equipment not part
of the product at the time of the first sale, "stands outside the reach of the tort recovery."
Id. at 1786-87.
186. See id. at 1787. The Supreme Court held, and Respondents conceded, that if the
damage occurred prior to the product's resale the loss of the additional equipment, or
"other property," would have been recoverable in tort law. See id. The Supreme Court
reasoned that nothing dictated a change in the status of "other property" in the case of
subsequent users. See id.
187. See id.
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with the defective item purchased. 188
Therefore, the Court concluded that denying tort recovery to a
second user for the same loss recoverable to the initial user diminishes
the manufacturers' incentive to provide safer products, erodes safety
incentives, and strikes at the fundamental objective of product liability
law. "'89 Additionally, barring recovery to a second user unfairly
immunizes the manufacturer from liability to persons later in the chain
of distribution who are unable to sufficiently contract for protection.' 90
Specifically, initial users are inherently less knowledgeable about the
intricacies of the product and its inherent risks19' and thus are less able
to provide appropriate warranties comparable to those offered by the
manufacturer.'9
In addition, the majority distinguished additional equipment from
component parts and affirmed its conclusion in East River '93 that users
are unable to recover in tort for damages caused by the component
188. See id. (discussing Nicor Supply Ships Assocs. v. General Motors Corp., 876
F.2d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that owner and ship charterer could recover in
tort law against the ship's manufacturer for seismic equipment added to the ship after its
sale, for the equipment's loss in a fire caused by the defective ship); United Air Lines,
Inc. v. CEI Indus. of Illinois., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 558, 562-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(holding that a warehouse owner could recover in tort law for damage caused by a
defective roof when a sudden dangerous event occurred that resulted in either personal or
property damage because of the defective product); A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 634 A.2d 1330, 1334-37 (Md. 1994) (holding that a farmer could recover
under strict liability for chickens killed as a result of a defective ventilation system,
even in the absence of death or personal injury, because a purchaser should neither be
obligated to bargain for destruction to property nor protection for physical injury to
himself/herself or to others).
1 89. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1787. Specifically, Justice Breyer stated that:
One important purpose of defective-product tort law is to encourage the
manufacture of safer products. The various tort rules that determine which
foreseeable losses are recoverable aim, in part, to provide appropriate safe-
product incentives. And a liability rule that diminishes liability simply
because of some such resale is a rule that, other things being equal, diminishes
that basic incentive.
Id.
190. See id. Parties who are unable to "sufficiently contract" are those with unequal
bargaining power or misinformation. See id. However, this generally does not include a
consumer who contracts with a commercial party. See generally U.C.C. Art. 2.
191. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1787.
192. See id. ("[T]he user/reseller did not make (or initially distribute) the product
and, to that extent, he normally would know less about the risks that such a warranty
would involve").
193. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986);
See also supra notes 107-117 and accompanying text.
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parts. 194 The Court reasoned that the extension of recovery to second
users for additional equipment is not analogous to a user's recovery
for damage caused by the component part to the original product. 195
Rather, East River affirmatively bars recovery for damage caused by
component parts to the original product.196 The Court reasoned that
because most machines contain component parts, extending relief for
such damage would effectively permit recovery in virtually every
products liability property loss action. 197 The majority reasoned that
manufacturers possess the ability to contract with component part
suppliers for liability of risk and loss or destruction, and these contract
negotiations provide incentive to manufacture reliable component
parts. 198
In contrast, initial users cannot equivalently allocate risk of loss for
their added equipment.' 99 The Court further noted that case law makes
a specific distinction between items added before the product enters the
stream of commerce and items added after its initial sale.200 This
distinction is regarded as evidence that a warranty serves to allocate
loss for additional equipment before the initial sale rather than after the
194. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1788 ("Our holding here, however, does not affect
[the East River] rule, for the relevant relations among initial users, manufacturers, and
component suppliers are typically different from those at issue here.").
195. See id.
196 See id. (holding that component parts are part of the product "that itself caused
the harm").
197. See id. (citing East River, 476 U.S. at 867). The Court noted that "all but the
very simplest of machines have component parts." Id. (citing East River, 476 U.S. at
867.
198. See id. (explaining that liability for the entire product where component defects
destroy the product itself heighten the desirability to manufacture safe component parts
that will not destroy the product, thus creating liability for the entire product and not
merely the component part); see also supra notes 82-101 and accompanying text
discussing buyer's ability to contract against loss.
199. See id. (reasoning that the initial users have less knowledge of the product and
cannot make effective contracts with the subsequent users, nor do they have resources
akin to manufacturers who are able to distribute losses among various component
suppliers of the product).
200. See id. (citing King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1054 (3d Cir. 1988)
(providing that Pennsylvania law bars recovery from component part suppliers in
negligence or tort law for economic loss such as the defective product damaging itself);
Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that damage to component parts is neither damage to "other property" nor
recoverable in tort law from the manufacturer or seller of the product because
purchasers/buyers do not "bargain separately for individual components of each
vessel"); Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th Cir.
1982) (stating that strict liability in tort is not applicable in the context of large
commercial entities who bargain for the obligation of loss).
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The majority concluded that the fear of excessive manufacturer or
distributor liability lacked merit.2 °2 It further recognized that
fundamental tort principles "such as foreseeability, proximate cause,
and the 'economic loss' doctrine" impose adequate protection against
excessive liability and impose restrictions upon invalid claims.0 3
Moreover, the majority concluded that the manufacturer's liability for
equipment added by the initial user does not expand the scope of
liability; rather, it merely maintains liability as it was intended.20 4
Specifically, the manufacturer remains liable for added equipment to
the second user, just as the manufacturer possessed liability for
damages to equipment added by the initial user of the product.2 5
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court granted recovery to
Saratoga Fishing Company for damage to the "skiff, nets, spare parts,
and miscellaneous equipment.., added to the ship by a user after an
initial sale. 20 6 Thus, the additional equipment was held to be "other
property" despite the product's resale and movement in the chain of
distribution.2 7
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, disagreed
with the majority's characterization of additional equipment as "other
property" despite its movement in the chain of distribution to a second
user.20 8 The dissenters recognized the superiority of two alternative
201. See id.
202. See id. ("[R]espondents argue that our holding would impose too great a
potential tort liability upon a manufacturer or a distributor. But we do not see how that
is so.").
203. Id.
204. See id. ("[L]iability would exist anyway had the manufactured product simply
remained in the hands of the Initial User. Our holding merely maintains liability ...
despite the presence of a resale [.J").
205.. See id.
206. Id. at 1789.
207. See id. (referring to the East River Doctrine setting forth "other property" as
property distinct from the product itself that causes the harm). In a side note the
majority explained that recovery is permissible for "other property" that " itself played
no causal role in the accident that caused the physical harm." Id.
208. See id. at 1789-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent rejected the majority's
holding, coining the "initial-user rule," and concluded that it merely "makes liability
turn on ... whether the, person who adds additional equipment to the product uses that
product before selling it." Id. at 1790 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that
the majority's reasoning for liability, i.e., merely whether the product was used prior to
resale, was equally as random as basing liability upon whether the harm occurs before or
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methods for determining when the product is fixed, thereby providing
a basis for distinguishing the product from "other property" following
the product's resale.2 °9
Prior to discussing the appropriate characterization of additional
equipment, Justice Scalia noted his reluctance to grant certiorari in the
case, stating that "the Court sets sail into unchartered seas. . . . I
would feel less uncomfortable about our plying these unknown waters
if we were skilled navigators., 2 0 Additionally, Justice Scalia stated
that the determination of whether "other property" can include
additional equipment added by the initial user once the product is
purchased by a second user later in the chain of distribution is a case of
first impression.211 Justice Scalia made special reference to the
Court's holding in East River and the availability of multiple state
court rulings on that specific issue prior to this ruling upon which the
Court could draw in deciding the issue. 12 Therefore, Justice Scalia
stressed that because there was "[n]ot a single lower-court decision..
. address[ing] the precise question presented," and because the Court
lacked experience pertaining to these issues, the Court should not have
granted certiorari.213
after the product's resale. See id. at 1790 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 1790-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia focused upon two
alternative rules to avoid liability based upon "fortuities": the "last 402A-seller rule"
and the "object of the bargain rule." See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Under the "last
402A-seller rule" the product is "fixed when it is sold by the last person in the chain of
distribution who is . . . 'engaged in the business of selling such a product."' Id. at 1790
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964)).
Alternatively, the "object of the bargain rule" bases "the product" and "other property"
upon what was bargained for by the plaintiff and the seller. See id. at 1791 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). According to this rule, both the object of the bargain between the initial
purchaser and the manufacturer and whether the product was used prior to its resale is
irrelevant to determine "the product" and "other property. See id. at 1791 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
210. Id. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It would have been better, in my view, not
to grant certiorari in this case.").
211. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the only lower court to address this
specific issue was the Ninth Circuit, in the present action).
212. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia contrasted the available case law
for the issue in Saratoga with that available to the Supreme Court in East River. See id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that in East River the
Supreme Court had "a wealth of lower-court development to draw upon" that provided
"no less than three distinct positions on the economic-loss rule." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Consequently, the East River Doctrine was previously accepted and tested
in several jurisdictions prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in that case. See id. (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
213. Id. Certiorari was granted by the majority court including Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg.
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Despite Justice Scalia's reluctance to rule upon the issue, the
dissenters proposed the adoption of two rules that do not characterize
additional property added by the initial user as "other property." These
rules rebut the majority's view that a product is fixed at the point of
entering the stream of commerce upon its sale to the initial user.' 14
First, the "402A-seller rule," based on section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 2 5 approximates when the product is
fixed and what is included as the product in determining the seller's
and manufacturer's liability.21 6 Specifically, the "last-402A-seller
rule" provides that the "'product' would be fixed when it is sold by the
last person in the chain of distribution who is . 'engaged in the
business of selling such a product.' 217
The dissent reasoned that premising liability upon the last person in
the chain of distribution promotes uniformity in the application of tort
law with regard to end-users because it avoids evaluation of whether
the distributor used the product prior to its resale. 2 8  Rather, the
"product" is the item as it was last sold by a commercial entity.1 9 In
addition, the dissent noted that the "last-402A-seller rule" invokes tort
law only when contract-warranty law is "infeasible., 220  Therefore,
214. See supra note 206 (discussing the "last-402A-seller rule" and the "object of the
bargain rule").
215. See supra Part II.C.
216. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct at 1790-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a side note,
Justice Scalia commented upon the determination of additions made before and after the
product leaves the market chain of distribution where the plaintiff is a commercial party.
See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent noted that even the "last-402A-
seller rule" would be unnecessary where the plaintiff is a commercial entity. See id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Because commercial users are typically knowledgeable and
familiar with insurance and other forms of protection against loss, they are not
disadvantaged by disparities in bargaining power and can obtain extensive warranty
protection. See id. at 1791 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Therefore, Scalia, in his dissent,
reasoned that if the plaintiff is commercial, presumably he or she is adequately protected
against loss through warranty or contract. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover,
relying upon the holding in East River, Scalia noted that where parties can adequately
protect against risk of loss, the application of tort law is overreaching and unnecessary
judicial intermeddling. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1790 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1964)).
218. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 1790-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 1790 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent noted that the
"last-402A-seller rule" denies recovery in tort law when the purchaser had the
opportunity to provide protection against loss or damage. See id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Because in commercial settings sellers generally provide warranty or
contract terms to cover the use and life of the product, the opportunity to obtain
warranty protection is reasonable and requires little judicial interference. See id. (Scalia,
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Justice Scalia concluded that the "last-402A-seller rule" is more in line
with the Supreme Court's prior judgment in East River.22'
Essentially, the dissent concluded that the "last-402A-seller rule"
equally distinguished variations in the product prior to and after its
dissemination in the chain of distribution.2 22
Second, the dissent favored the "object of the bargain" rule.223 This
rule, arising in both federal and state law,224 bars tort law interference
in private bargains where a purchaser claims loss for the purchased
product.225 The dissent relied upon the rationale of previous federal
and state court decisions to support the "object of the bargain" rule.226
J., dissenting).
221. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The last-402A-seller rule is also more
consistent with one of the principal considerations underlying our decision in East
River: the desirability of invoking tort protection only where contract-warranty
protection is infeasible.").
222. See id. at 1790-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that both the "last-402A-
seller rule" and the majority's "initial-user rule ...essentially attempt to differentiate
between additions made before and after the product has left the market chain of
distribution").
223. See id. at 1791 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d
1047, 1051 (3d Cir. 1988)). The "object-of-the-bargain" rule "rest[s] on the premise
that one must look to the product purchased or bargained for by the plaintiff in
determining whether additions constitute 'other property."' Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In support of the "object of the bargain rule" the
dissent noted several federal court decisions that denied recovery under various states'
tort laws against the manufacturer of a component part for losses to the product when the
product was damaged by the component part. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); See, e.g.,
Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 741-42 (11th Cir.
1995) (providing that under Florida law, a home builder was barred by the economic loss
rule from alleging claims against the manufacturer of chemicals that were applied to
plywood who failed to warn that the treated plywood was inappropriate for placement in
certain areas of the home); Transport Corp. of Am., Inc. v. International Bus. Mach.
Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that under Minnesota law, the
economic loss doctrine bars recovery in tort law in commercial transactions for loss,
excluding loss involving personal injury or "other property" damage); King, 855 F.2d
at 1054 (denying recovery under Pennsylvania law against the component part supplier
under negligence or strict liability law for economic loss in which the product merely
injures itself); Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925, 928-929
(5th Cir.) (stating that because purchasers do not bargain separately for each component
part of the vessel, recovery in tort is denied under federal maritime law for economic
losses that arise to the product itself-including damaged component parts).
225. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1791 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that East River
suggested there was "inadequate reason" to permit tort recovery by the purchaser for loss
of the product where private parties have the opportunity to independently negotiate for
protection against such loss).
226. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Although the holdings of these cases are not
precisely on point ...the rationale of those decisions is in tension with the Court's
holding today, and supports what might be called an 'object-of-the-bargain' rule.").
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Specifically, in denying recovery for the loss of the product, including
the component parts, these state and federal courts determined that "the
product" is what the plaintiff purchased and not what the defendant
sold.227 The dissent explained that although these decisions do not
address the issue of a second user as a plaintiff when the plaintiff is the
initial user, they provide useful insight into determinations of the
product and the characterization of loss. 228 Justice Scalia concluded
that the holdings in these state and federal court cases were properly in
accord with the Court's earlier ruling in East River.229
In addition, the dissent specifically recognized jurisdictional trends
favoring broad interpretation of "economic loss" to include items
previously characterized as "other property. "230 Losses conceivably
contemplated by the parties at the time of the bargain are economic
losses that can be protected against by negotiations during
bargaining. 23 ' Therefore, damage to additional property is a
foreseeable loss at the time of bargaining between the second user and
the initial user.232 Additional items, because they are contemplated and
227. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing King, 855 F.2d at 1051 (holding that
"[i]n determining whether a product 'injures only itself for purposes of applying the
East River rule ... one must look to the product purchased by the plaintiff')); Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244, 1247 (Fla.
1993) (stating that "[t]he character of a loss determines the appropriate remedies, and, to
determine the character of loss, one must look to the product purchased by the plaintiff,
not the part sold by the defendant").
228. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The decisions cited by Justice Scalia
distinguished between the ultimate product received by the purchaser and the various
components that comprise the product. See supra note 227 for a list of cases. By
focusing on the ultimate product received instead of the various parts, "the product" is
obviously the final outcome that exchanges hands between a seller and consumer. See
supra note 227.
229. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1791 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, East
River was the underlying rationale for courts that held that the character of loss is
determined by what is bargained for by the plaintiff. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). For
example, in King, the Third Circuit stated that "[a]s we read East River, it is the character
of the plaintiff's loss that determines the nature of available remedies." King, 855 F.2d
at 1051. Courts such as King, interpreted East River as favoring contract-warranty
remedies above tort law where parties are able to bargain for loss. See Saratoga, 117 S.
Ct. at 1791 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing King, 855 F.2d at 1051).
230. See id. at 1792 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]here has been a growing
trend in many jurisdictions to interpret 'economic loss' broadly to include damage that
formerly was considered 'other property"' (quoting Fox & Loftus, supra note 68, at 264-
65)).
231. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing that "[o]ther property' does not
include damage to property if those losses are direct and consequential losses that were
within the contemplation of the parties and could have been the subject of negotiations
between the parties" (quoting Fox & Loftus, supra note 68, at 264-65)).
232. See id. at 1790-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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foreseeable at the time of bargaining, are integrated into the product at
the time of resale and thus not considered "other property. 233
Consequently, additional items are themselves part of the product that
itself caused the harm.234 In light of the Supreme Court's earlier
decision in East River, harm caused to items considered part of the
product that itself caused the harm are recoverable only by contract and
warranty provisions.235 Consequently, the dissent advocated the
application of the economic loss rule to property added by an initial
user arising out of foreseeable identification of the additional items at
the time of the second user's purchase.236
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority in Saratoga "set sail into unchartered" waters and
created greater confusion in the area of economic loss in products
liability where confusion was already prevalent.2 37 The majority
labeled property that was part of the product at the time of the second
user's purchase as "other property" and granted recovery for this loss
in tort law where the economic loss doctrine provided the more
appropriate form of recovery.238 In this case of first impression, the
majority ignored accepted understandings of tort law that permit
recovery in tort only where contract law is infeasible.2 39
Consequently, the majority has created a windfall for irresponsible
purchasers who fail to insure at the time of the transaction against
potential loss from the product's failure to perform, because they may
seek recovery in tort where it is normally denied.24° Furthermore, the
233. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 1791 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our decision in East River suggests ...
there is inadequate reason to interfere with private ordering. ... (citing East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872-873 (1986))).
236. See id. at 1791 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court sets sail into
uncharted seas ..."); See also supra notes 208-36 and accompanying text discussing
Justice Scalia's dissent.
238. See id. at 1786. Contract law provided the more appropriate form of recovery,
but not necessarily the more favorable form of recovery to the plaintiff. See id. at 1786
(citing East River, 476 U.S. at 872-73). In this case, because warranty between the
parties did not provide recovery for loss, in the plaintiffs view tort law was the more
appropriate form because it compensated for some loss. See id. at 1787-88.
239. See supra Part II.B-C (discussing the integration of tort law in products liability
and the underlying rationale for its use).
240. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the purchaser's windfall); See also Brief Amicus
Curiae of National Association of Manufacturers and Raychem Corp. in Support of
Respondents at 13, Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783
1998]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
majority's surface discussion of the commercial nature of the
transaction and its impact upon the form of recovery for economic loss
leaves unanswered the form of recovery when the purchaser is a
commercial party.241 As such, courts will continue to grapple with
whether a commercial purchaser with knowledge and expertise of
contract and warranty provisions is barred from tort recovery for
economic loss based upon his or her commercial character only.242
A. The Unchartered Seas-Leading the Courts Aground
The majority's premature decision to grant certiorari, as noted by
Justice Scalia's dissent, is the source of the majority opinion's vague
conclusions.243 Justice Scalia notes that in complex areas such as
products liability law, earlier state and federal interpretations assist the
Court in its ruling.244 These alternative interpretations provide the
Court with various solutions that have withstood time and undergone
criticism and change in response to well-monitored outcomes. 245 For
example, history illustrates that products liability issues are extensively
evaluated by state courts prior to final rulings by the Supreme
Court.246 However, in Saratoga, the issue of a' second user and the
designation of property added by the original user as other property or
the product itself merely arose in the Ninth Circuit and was later
appealed to the Court.24 7 State courts never addressed at length the
best form of recovery permitted in this situation.248 Thus, the majority
relied upon only slightly analogous holdings in federal courts that had
interpreted both maritime and various state tort laws to guide its path in
(1997) (No. 95-1764).
241. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the commercial purchaser).
242. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1790-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243. See id. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244. See id. Justice Scalia stated, "I have little confidence in my ability to make the
correct policy choice in an area where courts more experienced than we have not yet
come to rest. I would have been inclined to let the lower federal courts struggle with this
issue somewhat longer . . . [to] develop a common-law consensus .... " Id. at 1792
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion rejected
Justice Scalia's hesitance to grant certiorari in the case. See id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
245. See id. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that historically state courts
pilot new controversies).
247. See id. at 1785-86.
248. See id. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit remains the only
lower court to rule upon the issue in Saratoga. Justice Scalia in his dissent stated that
"[n]ot a single lower-court decision (other than the one under review) has addressed the
precise question .... " Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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understanding products liability law on this issue.249
The majority's conclusion is circular and rebuttable as shown by the
argument it advanced to discredit the defendant's position.25 0 For
instance, the majority created the "initial seller" rule to promote stable
and reliable definitions of "other property" and the product itself.
25
'
The rule the majority heralds, however, hinges liability upon equally
weak and "lucky" circumstances.252 Specifically, basing the definition
"other property" on whether or not the product was used prior to its
resale is an arbitrary guideline for tort law liability.
2153
The dissent appropriately advanced this argument when it stated that
because a car dealer uses a car as a demo and adds a stereo system
prior to its sale, this does not detract from the fact that a second
purchaser bargains for the whole product in its entirety, including the
added stereo.254 Therefore, recovery in tort for the loss of the stereo
hinges only upon whether the car was used for a short time as a demo
by the dealer. 255  This reasoning conflicts with traditional rationale
underlying the imposition of tort law in products liability, namely,
whether the product is used rarely signifies whether the purchaser
249. See supra Part III.C.1. For example, the Court relied upon rulings in component
part cases to determine how a product is determined and what encompasses "other
property." See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1788. For examples of this type of case, see
Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a homeowner could not recover in tort against the manufacturer for
fraudulently including the purchase of chemically treated plywood without adequate
knowledge of the product); Transport Corp. of Am., Inc. v. International Bus. Mach.
Corp., 30 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the economic loss doctrine bars
recovery for economic losses in commercial transactions); King v. Hilton-Davis, 855
F.2d 1047 (3rd Cir. 1988) (barring recovery against component part suppliers in tort for
economic loss caused by product defects when product only damages itself); Shipco
2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1987) (providing that a
purchaser was denied recovery in tort for damage to components of the product resulting
from unrelated component part defects).
250. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1790 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing that the
majority rule merely "turn[s] on a different fortuity").
251. See id. at 1788.
252. See id. at 1790 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Scalia makes reference to
the "fortuity" of the majority rule. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asked:
[w]hy should the buyer of a car whose engine catches fire and destroys the
entire vehicle be able to recover in a tort action against the manufacturer for
the value of the dealer-added hi-fi stereo system if the car was a demo, but not if
the car was brand new?
Id.
255. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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needs judicial protection because of infeasible warranty protection.256
B. The Purchaser's Windfall-Tort Recovery for the Lazy Purchaser
The Supreme Court previously ruled on the issue of "other
property" in a commercial transaction where the plaintiff was the initial
purchaser from the -manufacturer.257 The Court unequivocally barred
recovery in tort, either through strict liability or negligence, in products
liability actions for purely economic loss. 258 The East River doctrine
utilized the economic loss theory and barred recovery because
warranty law adequately protected the purchaser's interest in the
bargain. 25 9 However, the Supreme Court in Saratoga contradicted this
holding and threatened the delicate balance between tort and contract
principles within the area of products liability.26
In Saratoga, the Saratoga Fishing Company, although a second
purchaser, bought the product from an initial user with full knowledge
of its additions and components.261 In fact, at the time of the
purchase, Saratoga Fishing Company operated the ship for several
years prior to its formal possession by the sale.262 The majority
inaccurately assumed that Saratoga Fishing Company was unaware of
256. See supra notes 20-35 and 90-99 (discussing the traditional rationale for
recovery under warranty instead of tort).
257. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870
(1986) (holding that a commercial party cannot recover under product liability tort
where "no person or other property is damaged" and only when the damages are to the
product itself).
258. See id. at 871 ("When a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a
tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are
strong.").
259. See id. at 873.
260. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1788-89 (holding that added component parts fall
within the gamut of East River's "other property," which is not considered the product
itself).
261. See generally Respondents' Brief at 6, Saratoga (No. 76-1917). The
Respondents' brief notes that the sale between the plaintiff and the initial purchaser was
"the first time that the MIV Saratoga was sold as a completed fishing vessel capable of
performing its mission." Id. As a purchaser interested in a product to perform its
intended functions, it would be absurd to presume that the purchaser had no knowledge of
the product's parts or capabilities. See id.
262. See Saratoga, 69 F.3d at 1435. The completed vessel outfitted with the
additional equipment was first launched under the ownership of the initial purchaser,
Madruga, and captained by Manual Vargas. See id. Captain Vargas operated the ship for
two years as a tuna seine. See id. The Saratoga Fishing Company, principally owned
and operated by Vargas, purchased the ship from Madruga equipped with the five
speedboats, a purse skiff, a seine, and various electronic and navigational equipment.
See id.
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the additions and bargained for the additions separately from the
product. In contrast, Saratoga Fishing Company bargained for the
price of the ship as a whole unit, including the additions provided by
the initial purchaser, now seller.2 63 Essentially, this created the same
"as is" purchase examined in East River. 264 Those who purchase the
product "as is" accept the product in its current, altered condition after
inspection and contractually assume full responsibility for the product,
including its maintenance and repair.265
Purchasing a product "as is" does not alter the boundaries between
contract and tort remedies.266 Specifically, tort law is not purchasers
safety net after failing to contract for economic losses arising from the
product's failure to meet their performance expectations. 267 Before
purchasing the product, the purchaser is free to insist on additional
warranty terms, obtain adequate insurance, or purchase another
product.268 Manufacturers rely upon warranty remedies as the sole
avenue for reimbursement because the potential losses are reflected in
the product's purchase price.269 Permitting judicial interference, such
as allowing tort claims simply because warranties were not previously
procured, creates a windfall for purchasers because recovery is
permitted for a loss that was possibly within the parties' contemplation
at the time of the bargain but left unsecured.27 °
263. See Respondents' Brief at 6, Saratoga (No. 95-1764) (stating that "Saratoga
bought the vessel 'as is, where is,' with no warranty other than that 'said vessel and her
appurtenances will be in operable condition upon delivery of the Bill of Sale").
264. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 875
(1986) (stating that the "charterers took the ships in 'as is' condition, after inspection,
and assumed full responsibility for them .... ); Respondents' Brief at 11, Saratoga
(No. 95-1764) (providing that "[a]lthough the disappointed charterers in East River were
without a contract remedy, like Saratoga, they specifically took the ship 'as is"').
265. See East River, 476 U.S. at 875 (stating that an "as is" purchaser "assume[s]
full responsibility . . . including responsibility for maintenance and repairs and for
obtaining certain forms of insurance"); John R. Trentacosta et al., Commercial
Transactions and Contracts, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 433, 470 (1996).
266. See East River, 476 U.S. at 875. The Court in East River held that despite the
purchaser's disappointed economic expectations there is "no reason to extricate the
parties from their bargain." Id.
267. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the warranty and the purchasers ability to
foresee loss prior to occurrence of the loss).
268. See CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 91, § 1-3, 915-16; see generally Pulte
Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 742 (11th Cir. 1995);
Respondents' Brief at 16-17, Saratoga (No. 95-1764); Brief Amicus Curiae of National
Association of Manufacturers and Raychem Corp. in Support of Respondents at 15-17,
Saratoga (95-1764).
269. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 95, at 680.
270. See, e.g., King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1054 (3d Cir. 1988). The King
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Essentially, "as is" products cost less to the purchaser because
manufacturers do not increase costs to compensate for potential
warranty losses. 7' However, the windfall arises when purchasers,
without the warranty, gain the benefit of purchasing the product at
lower cost and still receive reimbursement for their loss under tort
remedies.7  In addition, manufacturers could not recoup the cost of
this potential liability by distributing their potential losses among the
market prices of their products because tort recovery is unforeseeable
and difficult to accurately reflect in the product sale price. 73 Contract
and tort law symbolize a delicate balance between foreseen loss and
unacceptable loss to persons or property. When independent actions
can secure a foreseeable loss, judicial interference is unwarranted and
only upsets the balance relied upon by both manufacturers and
purchasers.274
The majority in Saratoga argued that the defendant's inability to
justify its claim that resales should both restrict tort liability and alter
property originally labeled "other property" merits recovery in
court stated:
The economic loss rule is a policy judgment that in a commercial context the
possibility of an inadequate recovery occasioned by bankruptcy, a
commercial risk that a purchaser assumes in choosing a seller, does not justify
permitting a tort recovery that will allow a purchaser to reach back up the
production and distribution chain, thereby disrupting the risk allocations that
have been worked out in the transactions comprising that chain.
Id.
271. See, e.g., Respondents' Brief at 6-7, Saratoga (No. 95-1764) ("[T]he
disclaimer of warranties on the vessel and all of her appurtenances was in exchange for a
lower purchase price than would have been changed if Madruga had included extensive
warranties.").
272. See, e.g., Pulte, 60 F.3d at 742 ("Having failed to avail itself of the
opportunity to mitigate the risks of potential disappointment at the time of contract
negotiation, [plaintiff] cannot now resort to the courts to save it from a bargain
improvidently made.").
273. See generally D'Angelo, supra note 75, at 602-03. "[Tlhe consuming public
ultimately suffers when manufacturers are prevented from properly managing and
reliably predicting the consequences of their business transactions." Id. at 603 (quoting
Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (N.Y. 1995)).
274. See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 917, 947 (1966). This article reinforces the historical preference for contract law,
providing that:
The broad protection accorded economic interests by contract law is absent
from the tort field primarily because the injured party's interest is viewed as
insufficient to support restrictions upon the defendant's freedom of action.
Such protection is justified in contract law because the defendant has
voluntarily undertaken a duty by choosing to contract with the plaintiff.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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contract. 75 Instead, it is the second user-purchaser who should
illustrate the infeasibility of traditional warranty-contract laws. Tort
law is the exception to economic loss, not the norm.276 Manufacturer
liability in tort law was created as an incentive to create "safer
products. '277  Further, tort law in products liability cases arose to
protect persons and property from damage because the purchasers
were either unable to fairly receive protection for their loss or because
the loss to the persons or property was so severe as to justify
additional forms of recovery. 278 However, in Saratoga, the plaintiff, a
second purchaser, made a "conscious commercial choice" when
purchasing the ship and its components. 279  This "conscious
commercial choice" is the bedrock of contract law because purchasers
can independently secure reimbursement for loss from a product
defect.2 18  Moreover, the judiciary may only intrude upon the bargain
with recovery in tort law when contract law is infeasible.28 1
Therefore, Saratoga's conscious choice to disregard adequate warranty
protection is inadequate justification to invoke liability in tort law.
C. Barring Tort Recovery to the Second User-Maintaining the Spirit
of the Law
Prohibiting the second user from recovering from the manufacturer
for the loss of integrated equipment installed by the initial purchaser
before the products resale does not bar recovery under tort law for
other items used with the product. 82 The majority correctly argued
275. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783, 1787
(1997), rev'g Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995).
The Supreme Court posed the question, "[W]hy should a series of resales, after
replacement and additions of ever more physical items, progressively immunize a
manufacturer to an ever greater extent from the liability for foreseeable physical damage
that would otherwise fall upon it?" Id.
276. See generally D'Angelo, supra note 75, at 593-99; Fox & Loftus, supra note 68,
at 261.
277. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1787.
278. See supra notes 36-67 and accompanying text (discussing the historical
development of products liability and the underlying rationale for the imposition of tort
law in products liability cases).
279. See Respondents' Brief at 14, Saratoga (No. 95-1764).
280. See CALAMARI, supra note 91, at 5-6.
281. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871
(1986); see also Fox & Loftus, supra note 68, at 261.
282. See Nicor Supply Ships Assocs. v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 501, 506
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding in an admiralty suit that a charterer could recover for the loss of
added seismic equipment damaged by an engine fire); United Air Lines, Inc. v. CEI Indus.
of Illinois, Inc., 499 N.E.2d 558, 563 (Ill. App. 1986) (permitting recovery to a
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that if the initial user had maintained possession of the product, the
loss was recoverable under tort law as "other property. 2 83 However,
the product did not remain in the hands of the initial user, and for this
reason, the majority's reliance on tort law as a means of recovery for
the loss of the property was improper.28 4  Rather, the additional
equipment constituted a critical component of the purchase-that is, it
was essential to the success of Saratoga's mission., 285 Therefore, it is
likely that even Saratoga Fishing Company regarded the additional
equipment as part of the product at the time of the bargain.286 Just as
component parts are considered part of the whole product, property
integrated into the product by the initial seller is part of the whole
product upon resale to a second purchaser and is subject to contract
law recovery.287
The majority ignored state and federal court reasoning to conclude
that the scope of the product is defined by the initial purchase.288 In
warehouse owner for damage to part of the warehouse caused by a defective roof); A.J.
Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 634 A.2d 1330, 1334 (Md. 1994) (holding
that a chicken farmer could recover for chickens killed by a defective ventilation
system).
283. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1787 (stating that "respondents here conceded that,
had the ship remained in the hands of the Initial User, the loss of the added equipment
could have been recovered in tort").
284. See id.
285. See Respondents' Brief at 24-25, Saratoga (No. 95-1764).
286. Saratoga Fishing Company's owner, Captain Vargas, operated the ship for two
years prior to his purchase of the vessel. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle
Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M.
Martinac & co., 117 S. Ct. 1983 (1997). Moreover, Captain Vargas operated the ship
with the additional equipment intact on the ship during these two years. See id.
Therefore, in purchasing the vessel it is likely that Saratoga bargained for the vessel in
its entirety as he operated the ship during his two year occupancy as the ship's captain.
287. See generally Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1790-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. See, e.g., Hininger v. Case Corp., 23 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that a combine purchaser could not recover in tort for lost profits and repair costs
against the component part manufacturer according to the economic loss doctrine);
American Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool and Mach., Inc., 767 F.2d 446, 447-48
(8th Cir. 1985) (providing that insurance carriers could not maintain action in strict
liability or negligence against component part suppliers for economic loss); Bowling
Green Mun. Utils. v. Thomasson Lumber Co., 902 F. Supp. 134, 136 (W.D. Ky. 1995)
(stating that "[t]ort and contract law occupy two separate and distinct fields"); Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 n.4 (D. Haw. 1993)
(holding that "tort recovery" is permissible for injury to the existing product where
injury is caused by component acquired later and added to existing product); Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino and Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla.
1993) (stating that a homeowner could not recover in tort for economic loss); Utah Int'l
Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 775 P.2d 741, 744 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
damage for economic loss in commercial setting is only recoverable in contract
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contrast, the Ninth Circuit's holding that the product is the item
"purchased by the plaintiff' is on point with "carefully reasoned case
law" in varying jurisdictions.289 Similarly, in the wake of East River,
courts grappled with the meaning of "the product" and held that the
product is the object bargained for by the plaintiff.29°
In other cases involving defective component parts, the plaintiff's
bargain determined the scope of the product, regardless of whether the
second user had ownership at the time of the conflict.291 Conversely,
the majority failed to provide a single case to support its adoption of
the initial user rule or any historical rationale to support the imposition
of tort law.292 Therefore, whether it is an initial purchaser who seeks
damage caused by a defective component part or a second user-
purchaser who seeks damage for the loss of equipment that was part of
the purchased product, the transferred product in the transaction
should determine the theory of recovery. Essentially, these prior
holdings at the state and federal level illustrate that the "plaintiff's
bargain is the appropriate place to start in defining the 'product"'
because the plaintiff is empowered to bargain for his or her own
economic expectations. 293 Although the consequences are sometimes
unfavorable to second users who fail to insure against loss, the judicial
system cannot compensate for the consequences of losses that are
partly the result of the purchaser's independent fault.294
D. The Commercial Purchaser and Its Ignored Impact
"[I]n commercial settings, where it is presumed that all parties have
the ability and motivation to bargain for risk allocation, 'a bargain is a
actions); Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1196, 1199
(N.Y. 1995) (providing that a downstream commercial purchaser could not recover in
tort from the original manufacturer for damages to the product itself because the buyer
had opportunities to allocate loss through warranty).
289. See Brief Amicus Curiae of National Association of Manufacturers and Raychem
Corporation in Support of Respondents at 8-10, Saratoga (No. 95-1764).
290. See supra notes 125-38 and accompanying text (discussing the "plaintiff's
empowerment").
291. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
292. See generally Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1786-89 (failing to provide case law in
support of its initial user rule).
293. See Brief Amicus Curiae of National Association of Manufacturers and Raychem
Corporation in Support of Respondents at 15, Saratoga (No. 95-1764).
294. In other words, purchasers who fail to allocate risk of loss prior to the damage
may be unable to compensate for this loss. It is unfortunate that purchasers would suffer
loss without reimbursement as a consequence of product defects; yet, it was the
purchasers' inattentive care towards securing a warranty that ultimately led to their fate.
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bargain."'295 The majority failed to note a commercial consumer's
impact upon the theory of recovery for economic loss.2 96 Rather, the
majority merely conceded, without discussion that the "context is
purely commercial," thus eluding to the commercial nature of the
manufacturer and not the commercial nature of the consumer-second
purchaser.297 Consequently, even though the majority recognized the
impact of East River upon its determination of "other property," it
failed to note East River's recognition of the distinction between a
commercial consumer and a non-commercial consumer.298
Specifically, East River represented a contract law-based preference
for recovery in commercial transactions.299 Contrary to the majority's
holding, the presumption that all purchasers require judicial protection
is unwarranted. a3 The commercial purchaser's characteristics directly
conflict with the theories underlying recovery in tort law.3"'
The commercial purchaser's sophistication, knowledge, and ability
to bargain and protect against risk of loss at the time of the purchase
negate the need for recovery in tort law.3 °2 The creation of tort law in
products liability, negligence, and strict liability arose out of a societal
need to protect the susceptible consumer, not the experienced and
knowledgeable consumer, from the insufficiencies of warranty law.30 3
Courts recognized the general consumer's inability to insure against
inequities in bargaining power between the "off the shelf' consumer
and the industrial manufacturer.3 4 However, similar to manufacturers
who compensate for liability through the price of their products, a
commercial purchaser can protect and compensate against loss.30 5 For
295. Respondents' Brief at 9, Saratoga (No. 95-1764).
296. See Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1786.
297. See id. (stating that "[tihe context is purely commercial ... [the issue] requires
us to interpret the Court's decision in East River").
298. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 871-74
(1986).
299. See id.
300. See id. at 872 ("Society need not presume that a customer needs special
protection. The increased cost to the public that would result from holding a
manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified.").
301. See Respondents' Brief at 17, Saratoga (No. 95-1764) (noting that commercial
purchasers are regularly insured against loss as a business practice).
302. See D'Angelo, supra note 75, at 599.
303. See generally East River, 476 U.S. at 866; Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d
145, 151 (Cal. 1965); Leebron, supra note 22, at 396.
304. See Respondents' Brief at 15, Saratoga (No. 95-1764) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c).
305. See id. at 17.
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example, commercial purchasers may spread either the cost of loss or
the price of the product and warranty "through price adjustments for its
own goods or services."306 Therefore, the commercial purchaser is
neither a susceptible nor helpless purchaser who requires tort law
recovery. °7
V. IMPACT
The majority's decision in Saratoga has created even murkier waters
in the already unclear area of products liability. Prior to Saratoga, an
impressive line of lower state and federal courts created well thought-
out and carefully reasoned circumstances for the imposition of tort law
recovery in a predominately contract-based area of law.3 °8 However,
Saratoga's initial user rule diminishes the importance of these lower
court decisions and creates new products liability law in direct conflict
with earlier interpretations.3 9 Moreover, as a result of Saratoga, the
manufacturer faces heightened liability without the ability to fairly
bargain with the individual purchaser to protect against or to allocate
liability.
310
Lower state and federal courts, previously forced to grapple with the
scope of "the product" in the wake of East River, are now forced to
grapple with the identity of the initial seller and the initial buyer. In the
case of outfitted products, where the initial buyer outfits the product
with additional equipment and changes the function of the product, it is
unclear how courts will define the initial seller.3 ' In such situations,
306. See id. Further, the Respondent states that the "purchaser's ability to spread the
cost of insurance ... may be superior to that of the seller of a commercial product." Id.
For example, in Saratoga, the plaintiff purchaser had even greater ability to spread the
cost of warranty or insurance than the defendant because the plaintiff could share the cost
of procuring insurance with the millions of tuna consumers. See id. at 17-18. On the
other hand, a commercial shipbuilder such as the defendant lacked equal room for cost
spreading and profit maneuvering. See id.
307. Purchasers have a heightened awareness of their bargaining rights and are not at
a disadvantage in negotiations.
308. See supra notes 130-33 (discussing the object of the bargain rule created after
the East River decision that barred recovery in tort law for economic loss).
309. See Brief Amicus Curiae of National Association of Manufacturers and Raychem
Corporation in Support of Respondents at 10, Saratoga (No. 95-1764) ("None the cases
cited by Petitioner ... supports their arguments, or provide any guidance to the Court in
fashioning a rule that would not severely restrict the import of East River." (sic.)).
310. See id. at 11-12.
3 11. Although Saratoga exhibited an "outfit" case, where the initial seller outfitted
the original vessel with equipment capable of making the vessel perform as a tuna
seiner, the Court failed to provide a definitive answer for all "outfit" cases. Instead, the
Court merely determined that the additional equipment was "other property" although
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does the initial seller or the initial purchaser define the product given
the fact that they changed the product's original function? It seems
irrational to define the product at the time it is originally produced
because subsequent purchasers often will use the product for purposes
other than its original purpose.312 Essentially, "[i]t makes little sense
and certainly depends on fortuity to say that the very modifications to
the vessel that make it what it is are not part of the product because
they happened to occur after a fishing company took title to the
vessel. 313
In addition, the majority's holding in Saratoga creates the very
outcome it expressed distaste for nearly a decade earlier in East River
when it emphasized the need to prevent "contract law [from]
drown[ing] in a sea of tort. '314 As a result, the decision in Saratoga
has the potential to heighten manufacturers' exposure to unlimited
liability in tort for economic loss.3 15 Essentially, manufacturers cannot
make traditional upstream bargains through warranties or contracts that
allocate liability to structure their business behavior, such as product
price determinations, because plaintiffs can disregard negotiated
warranty agreements and recover in tort law.316 Consequently, the
manufacturers' burden increases while the purchasers' unduly
decreases and tort law dominates recovery even in the area of
economic lOSS. 317 Saratoga reimposes the "too intermediate" or
"indeterminate" positions rejected previously in East River, forcing
lower state and federal courts to interpret a holding contrary to earlier
critics of the decision have support to illustrate the additional property is an
"integrated" part of the purchaser's bargain. See Respondents' Brief at 15, Saratoga
(No. 95-1764).
312. The vessel as purchased by the initial purchaser was incapable of performing
fishing functions until the initial purchaser supplied the ship with additional equipment.
See id. at 5-6. Therefore, the product sold by the manufacturer was merely a steel hull
vessel; yet, the product bargained for by Captain Vargas, Saratoga Fishing Company,
was a vessel capable of performing tuna fishing expeditions. See id. at 6.
313. Amicus Curiae of National Association of Manufacturers and Raychem
Corporation in Support of Respondents at 24, Saratoga (No. 95-1764).
314. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986);
see generally D'Angelo, supra note 75, at 594 (noting the need to keep the areas of tort
and contract law separate).
315. See Respondents' Brief at 38, Saratoga (No. 95-1764) ("Permitting recovery for
all foreseeable claims ... could make a manufacturer liable for vast sums.").
316. See generally D'Angelo, supra note 75, at 596-602.
3 17. Manufacturers must account for unforeseeable increased liability while the
purchaser gains economic benefit through the lower purchase price and the potential
reimbursement for losses where warranty was not bargained.
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decisions that clearly preferred contract law remedies.318
VI. CONCLUSION
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., the Supreme
Court ruled on a products liability issue without adequate guidance or
sufficient understanding and consequently proposed a ruling directly in
conflict with both lower courts and its own previous interpretations.
The majority's ruling in Saratoga granted tort recovery to a second
user in the market chain of distribution against the original
manufacturer for the loss of added equipment integrated by the initial
purchaser, even though the added equipment was part of the whole
bargained-for product by the second user upon his purchase. In so
holding, the Court stated that the added property by the initial
purchaser was "other property" and not part of the product itself. As a
result, the Court proposed an "initial seller" rule to determine the scope
of the product and "other property." However, the rule proposed by
the Court lacks sufficient support in light of lower state and federal
courts that clearly delineate the product as that bargained for by the
plaintiff according to the "object of the bargain test." Consequently,
Saratoga adds confusion to the boundaries of tort and contract law in
products liability when tort law clearly should have maintained its role
on the sidelines.
MEREDITH J. RINGLER
318. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing East River and its
criticisms of Seely's "intermediate" and "indeterminate" approach to recovery in
products liability).
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